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This thesis situates the political thought of Thomas Hobbes, particularly Leviathan of 
1651, in the wider context of changing ideas about the cosmos. In so doing, it 
investigates an overlooked concept of plurality of worlds and its effect on the world 
view in seventeenth-century England. In the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
human consciousness confronted a transition in the traditional relationship between 
nature, humans and society. However, insufficient attention has been paid to the 
motivating scientific forces behind English political thought over this period, especially 
to the concept of “plurality of worlds” which has been neglected at the expense of 
Copernican heliocentrism. The old system of order no longer functioned adequately 
due to a breakdown in traditional cosmological ideas, which meant disorder and a 
consequent search for alternatives. On the one hand, scientific developments of the 
period, such as the invention of the telescope, proved new hypothetical ideas of an 
infinite universe with a plurality of worlds. On the other hand, the developing ideas of 
“self” emerged as a conscious force, which referred to a consequent search for temporal 
secular salvation (the sovereign state). This development of self-consciousness can be 
traced in English political thought during this period. This paper does not discuss the 
entirety of the scientific revolution or of Thomas Hobbes, which have been sufficiently 
examined, but focuses specifically on the relationship between “plurality of worlds” 
and his political thought. This thesis will show that existing contemporary British 
intellectual history overlooks cosmological narratives through exploring the 
intersection between science, philosophy and politics in the early modern period. It 
therefore adds to a growing literature which introduces cosmology as a different 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Edmund Spencer published his Faerie Queene in 1590 presenting an early modern 
depiction of the universe that “What if within the Moones fayre shining spheare/ What 
if in euery other starre vnseene/ Of other worldes he happily should heare.”1 In this 
poem, Spencer imagined that both Moon and other stars may have their own worlds 
and thus may contain intelligent life. Furthermore, as Spenser speculated that each star 
may be a world, he intimated that a plurality of worlds could refer to an infinite 
universe.2  
Spenser probably provided one of the earliest references in English literature to 
other possible worlds beyond earth.3 This work suggested that the English intellectual 
was beginning to look to a wider universe, whereas previously it was were presented as 
the ancient cosmology which denied the possibility of a plurality of worlds. It was worth 
noting that this work was almost 20 years before the concept of “other worlds” was 
finally supported by Galileo’s telescopic observations (1609).  
Thus, this narrative of progression signalled a shift of cosmological thought 
instigated by the assimilation of Nicolaus Copernicus’s revolution into British society. 
It brings us to a not yet fully addressed question: how and why the seventeen-century 
English intellectuals respond to this new challenge, namely a plurality of worlds of an 
infinite universe?  
 
1 See the proem of Book II, 3.4-8, in The Faerie Qveene, ed. A. C. Hamilton (London: Longman, 2001) 
2 Steven J. Dick, Plurality of Worlds: The Origins of the Extraterrestrial Life Debate from Democritus 
to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p.2. 




To understand how the concept of “plurality of worlds” was received in England, 
and the importance of these cosmological changes, the relationship between these new 
knowledge and political thought need to be addressed. This dissertation seeks to 
examine the intersection between new cosmic knowledge and humans’ place within it, 
especially the changing perception of the notion of a “plurality of worlds”, and how it 
affects political ideas about order, nature, and state in the seventeenth-century England. 
Each chapter of this thesis will investigate one of these themes and how it contributed 
to the formation of political thought in early modern England. 
The first Chapter includes two sections, historiography and methodology. 
Together they provide a foundation for this thesis. Historians of science have often 
discussed how the Copernican revolution transformed Western thought, especially in 
astronomy, mathematics, and religion; this part argues that they have misunderstood 
the nature of the cosmological challenge to anthropocentrism. Instead, this part will 
argue that it is the possibility of a plurality of worlds and the idea of the infinite universe 
threatened the old stable universal order. The new Copernican knowledge challenged 
both traditional ideology and conventional thought; it was a philosophical, intellectual 
and theological challenge. 
When the old system of order no longer functioned adequately due to a breakdown 
in traditional cosmological ideas, what political theory became implausible or 
inappropriate? The heightened awareness of chaos that led to a renewed emphasis on 
order and control can be traced in English intellectual history during this period. 
Following Chapter one, Chapter two will develop arguments about the nature and 
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significance of the cosmological shift to seventeenth-century thought. In other words, 
this chapter will seek to illustrate what political theory looked like in a post-Copernican 
Revolution context. It will examine the state of cosmography and how continental ideas 
regarding the shape of the cosmos were received in England in the seventeenth century. 
Although the new astronomy did not produce a straightforward or definitive 
transformation of political thought in general, in at least a handful of texts the expanded 
universe enabled an alternative unearthly perspective.  
To explain this point, one of the period’s systematic and scientifically-minded 
thinkers, Thomas Hobbes, is probably a good place to look for such implications. 
Therefore, it will use Thomas Hobbes as a case study to show how to establish the 
representative secular sovereign state as unrelated to the divine cosmos.  
This chapter will suggest that it is possible to trace the shift from the traditional 
order to the Hobbesian by analysing the structural modifications in cosmic vision. It 
will firstly introduce some key concepts like a mechanic instead of organic conception 
of the universe and self-consciousness. To illustrate how these ideas were expressed, it 
draws on some primary sources, such as Giordano Bruno, Galileo Galilei, Rene 
Descartes as well as Thomas Hobbes. It also will examine how Hobbes received and 
digested the scientific theory regarding the change of cosmos.  
Based on Chapter two, Chapter three moves to Hobbes’s Leviathan, examines how 
Hobbes’s use of ideas like fragility, nature and organism and tracks or changes how 
these were used in a pre-Copernican model. It will discuss how the shift away from a 
divine cosmos to an infinite universe further complicated the way in which humans 
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confronted chaos and fear. Then it will examine how human consciousness confronted 
a transition in the traditional relationship between nature, humans, and society. In order 
to find a necessary solution, it was inevitable to create a new political theory. This part 
will mainly examine how Thomas Hobbes illustrated the new possibilities of a new way 
to think about political theory in this background. 
Finally, this part will argue that Hobbes was aware of the philosophical problems 
raised by new natural science, and he was concerned with political theories and basic 
concepts of the sovereign state. Conceptions of nature, of the self, of the larger cosmos, 
and of the relationships among them paved a way for Hobbes to describe the secular 
sovereign state. However, the narrative was not that straight forward. This part will 
discuss the extent to which mechanistic vision of the universe is a condition for 
Hobbes’s theory.  
Ultimately, this thesis does not discuss the entirety of the scientific revolution or 
of Thomas Hobbes, which have been sufficiently examined, but focuses specifically on 
the relationship between “plurality of worlds” and how English thought searched for 
coherence and certainty in the seventeenth century. This paper will show that existing 
contemporary British intellectual history overlooks cosmological narratives when 
exploring the intersection between science, philosophy, and politics in the early modern 
period. It therefore adds to a growing literature that introduces cosmology as a different 
perspective for understanding British political thought. 
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Historiography 
Britain underwent significant changes in almost every aspect during the fifteenth to the 
seventeenth century, which has produced a vast and diverse historiography around early 
modern England. Despite a broad spectrum of subjects being addressed by academics, 
the changes to the understanding of the cosmos and political thought within the 
historiographies are often missing. Therefore, the direction of influences is not always 
clearly stated. Through exploring related modern scholarship in a vast library of books 
and articles in science, politics and literature, this research will add nuance to the 
understanding of how the impact of changing cosmological beliefs on the thought of 
political theory over this periods, as well examine the thought of Thomas Hobbes into 
a wider historical narrative. 
Some historians have addressed the traditional cosmological thought before the 
Copernican Revolution in England. Paul Kocher in Science and Religion in Elizabethan 
England explained that the orthodox view held by many Elizabethan cosmologists was 
of Platonic-Pythagorean concepts of a harmonious and interdependent universe. 4 
Edward Grant, in The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages suggested 
that the combination of Aristotelian natural philosophy with Christian theology during 
the late Middle Ages provided a foundation for scientific knowledge.5 Both of their 
works shows that the concept of a “cosmos” in the period normally means a universe 
 
4 Kocher, Science and Religion in Elizabethan England, p.323. 
5 Edward Grant, The Foundations of Modern Science in The Middle Ages: Their religions. Institutional 
and Intellectual Contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1997), p.136. 
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composed of one central Earth, Moon, Sun, the other five planets, and the fixed stars. 
It was an entire geocentric universe. 
Though a vast number of books and articles on the history of science have been 
composed over the last century, the impact of “plurality of worlds” has been largely 
overlooked. The debate over “plurality of worlds” became heated again in the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries when the new Copernican heliocentric system 
made Earth like any other planet and no longer the centre of the universe.6  
During the early modern period the understanding of Copernican theory 
underwent significant change. John L. Russell in The Copernican System in Great 
Britain suggested that John Dee, who was Queen Elizabeth’s astrologer, “though 
respectful”, “was apparently unconvinced of Copernicus’s theories.”7 He declared that 
the general acceptance of Copernicus’s theory in England was “effectively won by 
1650.” 8  He thought that for much of this period, England was isolated from the 
continent in scientific aspects.9 Russell believed that “The first English writer to refer 
to the Copernican theory was Robert Recorde (c.1510-1558) in his book The Castle of 
Knowledge (1556)….He was at least sympathetic to the full Copernican system but his 
description on it was very incomplete.” 10  This study on the background of early 
modern English science obviously serves a valuable purpose for mine. 
 
6 Cosmology: historical, literary, philosophical, religious, and scientific perspectives, ed. by Norriss S. 
Hetherington (New York: Routledge, 1993), Introduction, p.518. 
7 Thomas Digges, A Prognostication Everlasting.1576. John L. Russell. The Reception of Copernicus’ 
Heliocentric Theory. Ed. Jerzy Dobrzycki (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1972), p.202. 
8  John L. Russell, The Reception of Copernicus’ Heliocentric Theory, ed. by Jerzy Dobrzycki.  
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1972), p.223. 
9 Russell, The Reception of Copernicus’ Heliocentric Theory, p.189. 
10 Robert Recorde, The Castle of Knowledge (London: ReginaldeWolfe, 1556); Russell. The Reception 
of Copernicus’ Heliocentric Theory, p.190. 
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Other historians like Frances Yates have emphasised the importance of Giordano 
Bruno’s visit to England. She has given a more specific description of Bruno’s 
connection with Hermetic tradition. Bruno is usually treated as a believer in astrology, 
magic and a scientific philosopher. He was an advocate of the infinite universe and 
influenced many fields of contemporary culture, especially in the newly developing 
field of natural philosophy.11Yates has successfully established the cultural atmosphere 
of the sixteenth century when the religious debates and the rise of modern nations 
intertwined. Intellectuals of that time had to consider the possibility that the Church and 
the old political order could collapse.12 This suggested the importance of the recovery 
of classical texts, during the period from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, for 
an understanding of the religious and scientific developments taking place at the same 
time.  
Among followers of Copernicus, Galileo continued to prove Copernicus’s theories 
and when he looked through his telescope, the whole universe changed.13 His invention 
of the telescope could be used to validate that a plurality of worlds was possible, and 
theologians explained this discovery as an evidence of God’s creative omnipotence.14 
Johannes Kepler, who was an astronomer, admitted the possibility of pluralism as 
well.15 Together they formed a possibility of other worlds of an infinite universe.  
 
11 Frances A. Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 
Toronto: London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), p.102. 
12 Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, p.102. 
13 Perhaps the definitive treatment of the differences between the old and new orders is Galileo's own 
Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, trans. Stillman Drake, 2nd. (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1967) 
14 Dick, Plurality of World, p.85. 
15 Johannes Kepler, Mysterium Cosmographicum (The Sacred Mystery of the Cosmos),1596. 
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In 1982, Steven J. Dick in his work Plurality of Worlds examined different 
propositions of other worlds from Democritus to Newton, giving a whole picture of the 
plurality debate from ancient Greece to the eighteenth century.16 According to Dick, 
the concept of other worlds was summarized by the English clergyman Robert Burton 
in Anatomy of Melancholy published in 1621.17 Thomas Digges was considered as “the 
earliest Copernican in England and Digges expanded the closed cosmos to an infinite 
universe.”18 
The book therefore offers some very useful insights and provides a comprehensive 
look at the history of the concept. However, Dick left much still to be explored: for 
example, how cosmic pluralism was perceived more widely, what was the status of 
humans and Christianity, and how to deal with the unique position of the human being. 
Though a fascinating resource, this book alone cannot provide a complete picture. 
Understanding the concept and meaning of “plurality of worlds” through different 
aspects of scholars’ works is useful because the current narratives of cosmology studies 
are largely pure scientific angles. The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of 
an Idea, by Arthur O. Lovejoy is invaluable for helping us to understand this concept 
and to explain the contradiction between the metaphysical principle of plenitude and 
the plurality of worlds concept.19 Ralph V. Chamberlin gave a detailed discussion of 
inhabited worlds from a scientific perspective. 20  The Extraterrestrial Life Debate 
 
16 Dick, Plurality of Worlds, p.1. 
17 Dick, Plurality of Worlds, p.202. 
18 Dick. Plurality of World, p.86. 
19 Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study in the History of an Idea (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1960), pp.156-158. 
20 Ralph V. Chamberlin, “Life in Other Worlds: A Study in the History of Opinion,” Bulletin of the 
University of Utah, 22, no.3,1932, pp.3-52. 
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written by Michal J. Crowe examined the scientific and philosophical influence of the 
plurality of worlds debate.21 Stanley J. Jaki in Planets and Planetarians discussed this 
debate comprehensively.22 David K. Lewis examined the concept of “worlds” in On 
the Plurality of Worlds.23  All of these valuable works paved the way for further 
research into the plurality of worlds in early modern England. 
Besides Giordano Bruno, the position of René Descartes (1596-1650) in the planet 
debate has been suggested earlier. Descartes’s discussion of the plurality of worlds 
seems to open a door for later scholars to follow. In fact, Lovejoy, Dick and Brake 
agreed that the Cartesian system of the world was “the most important pluralist 
cosmology of the seventeenth century.”24 Descartes interpreted infinity and plenitude 
as a metaphysical issue to show humans’ insignificance in the universe.25 However, 
“reason” was compensation this.26 In England, one of Descartes’ followers, Henry 
More (1614-87) in the poem Democritus Platonissans, or, An Essay upon the infinity 
of worlds out of Platonick Principles showed his paradoxical position in the other 
worlds debate. Michael J. Crowe suggested that in 1642, More in Psychothasia 
Platonica rejected the idea of an infinity of worlds, whereas More endorsed it in his 
1646 work.27 
 
21 Michel J. Crowe, The Extraterrestrial Life Debate, 1750-1900: The Idea of a Plurality of Worlds from 
Kant to Lowell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p.1. 
22 Stanley J. Jaki, Planets and Planetarians: A History of Theories of the Origin of Planetary Systems 
(New York: John Wiley,1977), p.1. 
23 David K. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell,1986), p.1. 
24  Mark Brake, Alien Life Imagined: Communicating the Science and Culture of Astrobiology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p.116; Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, pp.123-
125; Dick, Plurality of Worlds, p.117. 
25 Dick, Plurality of Worlds, p.107. 
26 Dick, Plurality of Worlds, pp.123-125. 
27 Crowe, The Extraterrestrial Life Debate, 1750-1900, p.66. 
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The possibility of a plurality of worlds brought a prominent concern which was 
how to deal with the supposedly unique relationship between humans, nature and God, 
especially human dignity. This acknowledged that there was no model to replace the 
old Aristotelian-Ptolemaic system which accorded with Christianity.  
One of the classics concerning Renaissance philosophical thought is Ernst 
Cassirer’s The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy.28 Within the 
book, he showed how the new universal life leads to the demand for a new cosmos of 
thought with human self-consciousness.29 This has opened a gateway for historians to 
explore the cosmological ideas within human self-consciousness. Cassirer believed in 
the relationship between man’s ego and the universe as “the enclosing and the 
enclosed.”30 Thus, the cosmos and the ego reacted mutually. It is an interesting topic 
that has been overlooked for several years.  
As for this point, Norbert Elias in Involvement and Detachment described the 
picture provided by Copernicus and its influence on humans’ reflections of themselves 
and their position in the universe.31 The idea of possible worlds led to philosophers and 
political theorists starting to consider humans as independent and fragile creatures.32 
Thus, the development of self-consciousness and reason rose together. This 
 
28 Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy. trans. Maria Domandi. 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,1963), p.1. 
29 Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, p.89. 
30 Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, p.190. 
31 Norbert Elias, Involvement and Detachment (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1987), pp.68-9. 
32 Eric Voegelin used this point to interpret Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan. Eric Voegelin, History of 
Political Ideas, Vol. 7: The New Order and Last Orientation, in The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, 
vol. 25, (Columbia: University of Missouri Press,2002), p.71. Also see Leo Strauss, The Political 
Philosophy of Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1936), p.90. 
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transformation caused by a new cosmological perspective seems to have been neglected 
in intellectual history.  
A significant cause for the shifting cosmology was the crisis of self-consciousness 
that arose with the cosmic expansion. By disrupting one’s relationship to the other, to 
the natural world and perhaps even more significantly, one’s relationship to God, the 
medieval political order started to change. Perhaps by accepting alien others as equal, 
people could find comfort in sharing such a vast space.  
 Although the implicit relationship between the cosmological change and political 
thought has not been addressed in some histories, Francis R. Johnson in his 
Astronomical Thought in Renaissance England realized it was worthwhile to explore 
scientific development in the reign of Elizabeth I, and its connections with the Civil 
Wars of the next century. 33 Based on Johnson’s work describing the scientific 
development in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England, the historian 
Christopher Hill made his excellent contribution in response to these questions. Hill 
noticed that there was a connection between “the new astronomy” and the concept of a 
plurality of worlds in Bacon’s thought, but did not clearly explain the suggested link.34 
Hill’s study is an enlightening source both for scientific literature and for political 
thought. It also helps historians further to contextualise the early modern English social 
condition.  
 
33 Francis Johnson, Astronomical Thought in Renaissance England: A Study of the English Scientific 
Writings from 1500 to 1645 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press,1937), p.1. 
34 Christopher Hill, Intellectual Origins of The English Revolution (London: Oxford University 
Press,1965), p.68. 
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In 1967, Hugh Trevor-Roper published an essay entitled Religious Origins of the 
Enlightenment, expressing his criticism of Hill’s book.35 Trevor-Roper believed that 
his abuse and misrepresentation of source material showed that Hill’s answer was 
problematic. John Robertson also wrote an essay about the Hill/Trevor-Roper debate.36 
However, some questions Hill raised were interesting. While Hill emphasised the 
influence of technological innovations on economical and practical dimensions; little 
attention was paid to “pure” science, especially the driving force behind it. But it is 
difficult to discern how much these factors influenced most intellectual groups of 
people in England, along with a systematic understanding of some changes in the 
cosmological assumptions of natural philosophy. 
A historian of political thought, J. G. A. Pocock, noticed in his book The Ancient 
Constitution and the Feudal Law: a study of English Historical Thought in the 
Seventeenth Century that historians of the seventeenth century sometimes spoke of the 
death of nature, which reflected the mechanization of the natural world.37 Moreover, 
new questions arose in terms of the relationship between God, humans and nature. This 
change brought a corresponding change in political thought.38 
Agreeing with Pocock, Hans Blumenberg assumed that when the earth became 
just one possible world among other worlds, nature lost its power to command imitation 
 
35 H.R. Trevor-Roper, Religion, the Reformation and Social Change, and Other Essays (London, 1967).  
36  John Robertson, “Hugh Trevor-Roper, Intellectual History and 'The Religious Origins of the 
Enlightenment'.” The English Historical Review (vol. 124, no. 511, 2009), pp.1389–1421. 
37 J. G. A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: a study of English Historical Thought 
in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1957), p.109. 
38 Dmitri Levitin. “From Sacred History to the History of Religion: Paganism, Judaism, and Christianity 
in European Historiography from Reformation to ‘Enlightenment’.” The Historical Journal, vol. 55, no. 
4, 2012, pp.1117–1160. 
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for humans. The result was that the natural world was revealed as mechanical and 
indifferent.39 Thomas Hobbes lived with this background, and thus he needed to build 
a new model to ensure salvation from the temporal world and make sense of humans’ 
unique place in the universe.  
The British historian of astrology and cultural astronomy, Nicholas Campion, 
explained in the paper Astronomy and political theory that astronomical models could 
and did influence political theory. 40  He regarded Hobbes’s thought as “Political 
Galileanism” because Hobbes made the state as mechanical as the universe.41 Frithiof 
Brandt in his book Thomas Hobbes’ Mechanical Conception of Nature, also provided 
a careful and detailed literature of Hobbes’s mathematic-mechanical view of nature.42 
There are questions still in need of explanation. What did Hobbes actually mean when 
he treated everything mechanically? Why did he think so? And what is the relationship 
between this view and his political thought?  
Another intellectual historian, Quentin Skinner, paid more interest to the specific 
thought of individuals. In searching for the origins of the concept of the modern state, 
Skinner traced the formation of “reason of state” and the emergence of a theory of self-
preservation respectively. This paper assumes the latter referred to the rational, isolated 
individual in a hostile world seeking for security, which was most accomplished in 
Thomas Hobbes’s theory. Indeed, Skinner’s two theories shared a common background 
 
39 Hans Blumenberg. “To Bring Myth to an End.” New German Critique, no. 32, 1984, pp.109–140. 
40 Nicholas Campion. “Astronomy and Political Theory” Proceedings of the International Astronomical 
Union 5. S260,2009, pp.595-602.  
41 Campion, “Astronomy and Political Theory”, p.598. 
42  Brandt Frithiof. Thomas Hobbes’ Mechanical Conception of Nature (Copenhagen: Levin & 
Munksgaard, 1928), pp.86-166. 
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in the seventeenth century when Europe was in intense conflict between Catholics and 
Protestants. Furthermore, there was a transformation occurring in the theory of natural 
philosophy because of the possibilities of other worlds. A new way with regard to 
relationships between political, religious and moral issues emerged in mid-seventeenth 
century England.  
Based on Skinner’s work, Richard Tuck dealt with the opposition between the 
republicanism and mixed monarchicalism of this period. Tuck revealed the progressive 
transformation in the theory of natural rights illustrated by Hugo Grotius, John Selden, 
and Hobbes.43 Their theories laid a foundation of enlightened science and enlightened 
politics for the next century. This was a valuable insight and Tuck located Hobbes’s 
theory in the context of scepticism. 44  But he seems to omit another attractive 
interpretation: that maybe Hobbes’s political concern was not the foundation of states 
or the state of nature. Rather, it was how to settle disagreements in judgment to make 
sure of individuals’ security and guard against disorder in a hostile and temporal world. 
Each of these books has laid the foundations for later historians’ research, and they will 
undoubtedly be invaluable for this thesis. 
The corpus of literature on the history of science and intellectual history is vast so 
that what was discussed here can only represent a small fraction of the material. There 
is still much to discover in this broad and fascinating field. Although there is much 
written about the history of early modern England, there is as yet no study which tracks 
 
43 Richard Tuck. Philosophy and Government 1572-1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), pp.154-279. 
44 Tuck, Philosophy and Government, pp. xii-xvii. 
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the concept of “plurality of worlds” and its influence on early modern political thought. 
This is crucial: knowing more about the evolution of the scientific revolution will tell 
us much about how to understand the birth of the modern world. There is a misleading 
understanding of the link between the Copernican heliocentrism and anthropocentrism. 
“Plurality of worlds” has not received enough attention, having only gained a targeted 
study of their own in the last few years.  
Generally speaking, it is an impossible task to describe all the intellectual forces 
at play in early modern England. Indeed, the early modern era was a composite of a 
number of traditions and to isolate any single element would be an unhelpful 
simplification. While there are many persuasive studies which have been made of the 
Medieval and early modern origins of the modern world, based on many scholars’ 
brilliant works which have been discussed above, this thesis will begin to address the 
current lack of acknowledgement around the histories of “plurality of worlds”. It will 
demonstrate the changes in cosmological thinking and how the intellectuals respond to 
the new knowledge in the late-sixteenth and the seventeenth-century, helping us to 
supplement a broader narrative of early modern England history. 
Methodology  
Professor John Robertson defined intellectual history as “the efforts of humans to make 
sense of their world, to conceptualise its features and to argue coherently about them, 
and to persuade others of the plausibility of their arguments.”45 J.G.A. Pocock and 
 
45 John Robertson pointed this out in a speech in Fudan University in China on May, 2017. Full Chinese 
version published in Zhejiang Academic Journal,20181,2018, pp.148-155. 
 21 
Quentin Skinner led an intellectual history tradition by criticizing the old one which 
took the history of ideas as a set of timeless and universal ideas.46 The leading historian 
of the history of ideas was Arthur Lovejoy, who defined the discipline as exploring one 
major idea in different contexts and times. As Lovejoy had argued in 1960 in his book, 
“unit ideas” showed an internal coherence in history, and thus the task of historians was 
to demonstrate these thoughts from the historical narrative with their internal logic.47 
The drawback of this older method was that it tended to encourage belief in a pre-
existing “eternal” thought in various contexts.  
In 1969, Skinner proposed an alternative method based upon analysing an idea 
“specific to its own situation in a way that it can only be naive to try to transcend.”48 
He urged a new method based on wider sources instead of classic texts and paying 
attention to the importance of rhetoric. To understand the incoherence in classic texts 
or ideas of individuals, Skinner intended to examine the precise circumstances which 
led men to select and use specific arguments at particular times. To understand the 
change of ideas, it is necessary to examine both the political and scientific history of 
the period and the arguments within it. 
The links between the arguments and specific circumstances need to be explored 
as the former were not merely a reflection of the latter. Instead, traditional ideas and 
ways of thinking usually interacted with specific events and social changes to produce 
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new arguments and new values. As has been addressed already, this thesis will follow 
this method and focuses on early modern thinkers and the context in which they lived, 
namely who are they, how they argue their opinions, and why they chose these opinions 
rather than others. In order to understand these changes in the seventeenth century, 
especially in Hobbes’ thought, it is necessary to try to rebuild the context in which he 
lived. Then it is possible to explore which specific arguments he selected to respond to 
political debate in the period, and why. 
To achieve this goal, the thesis has adopted “an approach which is both textual and 
contextual.”49 It chooses Thomas Hobbes’s writings as primary resources including 
The Elements of Law (1640), De Cive (1642), Leviathan (1651), On subjects (1655). 
Besides these works, there is Bacon, Descartes, Galileo and other early modern thinkers’ 
primary materials. Signy Gutnick Allen claims that her interpretive approach is to 
“explain developments in Hobbes’s thought primarily by reference to other elements of 
his theory.”50 Following this principle, this thesis examines the relationship between 
Hobbes’s scientific views of the universe, namely motion theory and the origin of 
sovereign rights.  
This thesis also follows what Signy states that “where contradictions have arisen 
within individual texts, I have opted for the interpretation which best preserves the 
coherence of the theory as a whole, rather than one which requires that Hobbes was 
entirely consistent in his use of language.”51 This point is useful when trying to link 
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Hobbes’s scientific insights with his political thought. In addition to analysing 
Hobbes’s view, this thesis aims to examine the change of cosmological and political 
thought in early modern England. In providing a discussion of early modern political 
theory after the Copernican Revolution, this thesis therefore illustrates the political 



















Chapter Two: New Perspectives 
The Definition of “Cosmology” 
When attempting to explore a historical set of ideas or beliefs related to “cosmology”, 
the meaning of the term has to be considered according to the specific historical context. 
The core question arouses: why would shifts in cosmological ideas implicate other 
categories of thought, especially political thought. Therefore, it is crucial to first 
establish what is meant by “cosmos”.  
The philosopher Milton K. Munitz offered some insights in his work Cosmic 
Understanding published in 1986. Munitz argued cosmology had a philosophical 
meaning for humans and described it as containing three levels of meaning. The first 
was “a purely intellectual craving and sense of wonder pushing humans to explore the 
universe.”52 The second was psychological security: that “humans need to situate their 
life in the universe.”53 This meant that humans assign themselves a position within the 
cosmos to gain psychological satisfaction and security and thus establish a purposeful 
system for humanity and society. Finally, there was a desire to understand the universe 
metaphysically, to establish “the fundamental levels, kinds, categories, types, degrees, 
or modes of that which exists or has being.” 54  The above definitions by Munitz 
emphasised humans’ desire and intention in a psychological and philosophical 
worldview, both of which undoubtedly feature heavily in a conceptual system, but were 
flexible enough to apply to multiple historical periods and contexts. 
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Nevertheless, this is not to say a society always possesses a single and coherent 
cosmology. Rather, different answers to Munitz’s three levels led to intellectual and 
social controversy rooted in different cosmological assumptions. A French historian of 
philosophy, Rémi Brague, developed Munitz’s argument in the work The Wisdom of 
the World in 2004. Brague traced the deep connection between the universe and 
humanity through the views of ancient Greece, Christianity, and Judaism. He presented 
an argument that cosmology was primarily a discourse between Man and world and 
therefore contained ontological and anthropological order.55 Finally, Brague described 
cosmology as signifying that “mankind’s place in the universe involved philosophical, 
political and religious themes: the significance and value of human life, the laws of 
nature, a divine cosmic designer and the secular order for the human being.”56 This 
was a sensible conclusion which contributes to a general understanding of cosmos 
which can be used in Western thought. It is problematic, however, as a category of 
historical analysis, because the definition is too broad to discuss the particular context 
of cosmology in seventeenth-century England.  
Ultimately, cosmology is a mixture of all of these definitions in varying and 
changeable ways. Both of these scholars argued that the concept of cosmology was 
bound up with human emotional attachment, which may help to explain why the 
possibility of cosmological pluralism took a long time to be generally accepted. Based 
on their works, I define cosmology as a mixed conceptual system designed by human 
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beings to achieve particular interconnected and integrated relationships with the natural 
world. Though cosmology has often involved relationships with the supernatural, and 
divine, world as well. 
The Old Cosmological Order  
Different epochs of European thought considered the universe, the nature, and man 
in various ways. In Middle Ages, the concept of “plurality of worlds” was influenced 
by ancient cosmology. The natural world was guided by the divine cosmos and chaos 
was prevented. Aristotle rejected a multiplicity of worlds as he concluded in On the 
Heavens that there is “neither place nor void nor time beyond the heaven.”57 The 
superlunary sphere was by the Aristotelian definition without change and all else in the 
cosmos was unchanging and balanced.58 The earth’s central position in the cosmos 
remains motionless, at least metaphorically still, because change in this context 
constituted corruption and disharmony.59 
In the twelfth century, the Latin translations of Aristotle’s works were introduced 
to Europe.60 His medieval followers Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas synthesized 
Aristotelianism with Christian theology, which further reinforced the opposition to plural 
worlds. As Steven J. Dick notes, a plurality of worlds had “grave implications” for 
Church doctrines, including “Redemption, Incarnation, and the implied one-to-one 
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relationship between man and his Creator.”61 Christians blended Greek cosmology 
with providentialism, which means God worked through second forces to influence all 
creations. 62  The closed, ordered and hierarchical cosmos connected with a stable 
framework and meaning guided by God. God created everything in the universe, 
including nature and humans. It was believed that there was a correspondence between 
humans and the universe.63 The superlunary sphere where God and angles live was 
constant, invariant, beautiful and good. On the contrary, the earth where human beings 
live was seen as a region featured by diversity and change, birth and death, generation 
and extinction. This model laid the foundation for early modem cosmology.  
To understand the relationship between the cosmos and man thoroughly, it is 
necessary to review the wider context of sixteenth-century and early seventeenth 
century thought. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, English writers lived 
in a world which was described as a combination of Greek cosmology and the Christian 
version. Popular belief held that the divine cosmos represented perfection, order and 
purpose. The system of celestial planets inspired human beings and thus they imitated 
the natural laws in society.64  
Besides, it produced and controlled the diversity and changes on earth. The 
fortunes of the human world could be predicted by divining the celestial sphere, which 
meant moral practice must take the regularity of the world as its role model. God 
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determined the content of laws of nature and nature had ethical significance for 
humans.65 Before the Copernican revolution, the old hierarchical cosmological order 
contained distinct classes relating to each other.  
Corresponding to the patterns of the cosmos in which all matters were ordered 
hierarchically, James Daly adopted Lovejoy’s explanation of the notion of the Great 
Chain of Being, which was “an interlocking and interdependent scheme of created 
things existing in a natural hierarchy.”66 One of the most typical examples was Jean 
Bodin who connected his political system with the cosmological hierarchal system. 
Bodin applied cosmic order to civilian order as he believed the former is superior to the 
empirical political order.67  
Bodin wrote that “I have, however, a firm conviction that [astronomical] regions 
and celestial bodies do not have the power to exercise ultimate control (a belief wrong 
even to entertain), yet men are so much influenced by them that they cannot overcome 
the law of nature except through divine or their own continued self-discipline.”68 In 
Bodin’s view, he admitted the influence of law of nature from the divine cosmos while 
he left room for humans’ self-consciousness. This particular arrangement implied an 
internal hierarchy system which reflected the principles of the traditional cosmological 
order.69 
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Moreover, the whole universe was understood as animated by laws which were 
necessary for the entire system. Theorists and politicians believed that there was a 
fundamental law and human was subject to it. As Richard Hooker said, “Of Law there 
can be no less acknowledged than that her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the 
harmony of the world: all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least in 
feeling her care and the greatest not exempted from her power.”70 In this system, human 
beings took a significant part in imitating laws from the superlunary region. Since 
everything was related, all were alike to be changed if the cosmic order collapsed. 
Humans had the key position in the chain of being, which provided possibilities for 
self-awareness once the ordered universe was replaced by an infinite and decentred one. 
Besides macrocosm, the “little world” of man which Nicolson mentioned as 
microcosm cannot be ignored. “Back of all these—elements, planets, humors—lay one 
central conception: belief in the interrelationship of the little world of man and the great 
world of the universe.” 71  Aristotelian cosmology taught, and most Elizabethans 
believed, that the sublunar sphere alone was mutable due to the imbalanced intermixing 
of elements. There existed four elements with corresponding qualities exclusive to each: 
earth, water, air, and fire. The fifth element only existed in the celestial realm, giving 
substance to heavenly bodies and to the angels who moved them about the universe.72 
The elements did not exist in pure form. On the contrary, stars, planets, and the 
moon influenced elements within the sublunary sphere. The elements moved, mixed, 
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to form the compounded stuff of nature. All change and variety were caused and 
maintained as celestial influenced the earth. Without this influence, all matter exists in 
a state of chaos. As John Milton wrote,  
“And chaos, ancestors of Nature, hold Eternal anarchy, amidst the noise Of endless 
wars, and by confusion stand. For Hot, Cold, Moist, and Dry, four champions fierce, 
Strive here for mastery, and to battle bring, Their embryon atoms.”73 
Chaos must be prevented because the divine cosmos maintained a constancy of 
order. The best state was motionless and stillness was superior to movement. However, 
everything on earth, including human beings, was “restless.” The Aristotelian explained 
that there was a “self-moved” soul striving internally. Living under the protection of 
the finite and closed cosmos, intellectuals used to consider internal rather than external 
forces in the search for motivations. Political thinkers used this metaphor to describe 
the proper ordering of society. “Whereupon as it would be a thing monstrous and 
incommodious to see a human body wholly compounded of heads arms legs or of other 
members uniform in themselves, so would it be altogether as disproportionate and a 
thing of itself insufficient if all men in a city were artificers husbandmen soldiers judges 
or of one self-condition and quality.”74 Society was constituted like man’s anatomical 
parts and each constituent part linked in the great chain. All citizens of the body were 
united as a functional whole with a predetermined hierarchy. Order and harmony were 
maintained because the inherent hierarchy naturally placed each individual in various 
social positions.  
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It was natural that some were born to rule, and most people’s duty was to follow. 
A man must know his place and duty otherwise he broke the law. Later Hobbes’s 
natural right theory that everyone was equal was alien to this frame. The body politic 
is thereby maintained when its members “do that thing which is required to the health 
of the whole.”75 It was thus that natural laws operated to preserve unity and harmony 
within the divined order. As in the body politic, law and order throughout the universe 
were instituted for the preservation and sustenance of its members.  
Based on these explanations and beliefs, the possibilities of other worlds unrelated 
to Earth could lead to uncertainty and anxiety. With this in mind, it can better 
understand why natural magic, alchemy, astrology, and the rise of Hermeticism, 
Platonism, Pythagorean numerology and other explanatory systems were popular 
during the period. Indeed, the traditional view was in many ways similar to Christian 
ideas, which assume a special privileged place in the universe for a particular chosen 
people. This explains the popularity of the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian system in the Middle 
Ages. Marjorie Hope Nicolson, in her study of the breakdown of circular theory, noted 
that the change in terms of the cosmos in the seventeenth century was that an organism 
was replaced by a machine.76 
 Sir Arthur O. Lovejoy in his seminal work The Great Chain of Being: A Study of 
the History of an Idea showed an attempt to explore the importance of the principle of 
plenitude and sufficient reason as opposed to scientific considerations. 77  Lovejoy 
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explained the contradiction between the metaphysical principle of plenitude and the 
plurality of worlds concept.78 The principle of plenitude was defined as “this strange 
and pregnant theorem of the fullness of the realization of conceptual possibility in 
actuality.”79 Lovejoy also extended the meaning of the term: “no genuine potentially 
of being can remain unfilled… that the world is the better, the more things it contains.”80 
Thus, Lovejoy emphasized that it was impossible to admit that God could have made a 
better world because of this principle.81  
To understand the worldview of the sixteenth-century English, it is reasonable to 
agree that they believed there was a fully determinate and unchanging cosmos which 
was constantly revealing itself and was consequently knowable. A social and political 
order was a reflection of a natural, Godly defined order. It was understood as a 
correspondent example of natural order rather than the representative of it. An ordered 
civil society was a reflection of God’s divine order and secure humans from disorder 
and chaos. 
Moreover, an ordered society assured order requiring each person to follow and 
fulfil their duty according to his degree and class. The divine order was the structural 
source of all private and public institutions as well as of man himself. Proper degree 
prevailed in the society, in the family, and in the “body politic”. As a man’s head and 
body exist together, the king and the Parliament were compared as the head and body 
of the realm. Sir Thomas Smith described the prince as “the head, life and governor of 
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this common wealth,” while the Parliament was “the whole head and body of the realm 
of England.”82 This was an understanding of the concept of “King in Parliament.” In a 
word, the commonwealth was as ordered as was divine nature and maintained by duty 
and degree. 
Theorists and politicians of this period believed that there was a fundamental law 
of nature through which reason could be interpreted or declared. All human law was 
subject to this law and included the king’s.83  As Richard Hooker said late in the 
sixteenth century, “where the king doth guide the state, and the law the king, that 
commonwealth is like a harp or melodious instrument, the strings whereof are tuned 
and handled all by one.”84 
With the fixed, immutable cosmos that divine order described, man’s unique place 
was secure. “The nature and condition of man, wherein he is less than God Almighty, 
and excelling not withstanding all other creatures in earth, is called humanity.”85 Not 
only was man’s place in the divine cosmos unique, but also his nature was certain. 
Within the society which was formed from certain orders of the divine cosmos, man 
had no conception of “self”. Unlike modern society, the notion that individuality was 
defined and within “self” was quite strange because individuals only existed by one’s 
specifically arranged place in the hierarchical oriented society.  
Individuals would not feel isolated or alienated. Man’s arranged place in the divine 
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cosmos along with his duty gave him a strong sense of belonging and security in society. 
The integrated society fulfilled man’s need for social satisfaction. This relationship 
between private and public remained until the last years of the sixteenth century and 
early seventeenth century. However, the influence of Copernican cosmology caused 
heated debates about the possibility of other planets with intelligent life from the 
seventeenth century until the nineteenth century. 
The New Expanded Universe 
The early modern period has usually been credited with the sudden development 
of a new scientific revolution interspersed with the revival of the Classics and the quest 
for humanism. The most seminal works on the changes to the understanding of the 
cosmos in the seventeenth century are by two historians of science, Alexandre Koyre  ́
and Thomas Kuhn.  
In 1957, in the introduction to Alexandre Koyre  ́book entitled From the Closed 
World to the Infinite Universe, he claimed that a very radical spiritual revolution 
happened in seventeenth century when modern science is the root and fruit.86 Koyre  ́
asserted that the impact of the revolution was not only in scientific aspects but in 
philosophical meaning: “man lost the very world in which he was living and about 
which he was thinking, and had to transform and replace not only his fundamental 
concepts and attributes, but even the very framework of his thought.”87 These two 
aspects together destroyed the hierarchically- ordered cosmos and the concepts of value 
 
86 Koyre ,́ From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, p.1.  
87 Koyre ,́ From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, p.2. 
 35 
which were based upon it.88 Koyre  ́thought there was a divorce between the world of 
value and the world of facts, meaning that purpose and harmony have been stripped 
from the divine cosmos.89 Seen in this light, this chapter agrees with Koyre  ́that the 
influence of the cosmological revolution has been underestimated.  
Published in the same year, Thomas Kuhn’s The Copernican Revolution served a 
similar function, but he argued that the cosmological drive did not exist in a vacuum. 
Instead, humans constructed their “universe” in response to real conditions of social 
and economic needs. It is possible that certain changes in cosmological thinking 
occurred in response to material world conditions.90  
Both authors expressed the same concern, which was what would happen when 
scientific understandings of cosmological ideas or social conditions changed. After all, 
humans can only make sense of the world based on their own understanding and control 
of the material world. If conditions change, then changes in certain cosmological 
thinking become possible. At some point, scientific developments can testify that the 
cosmos is different from previous assumptions.  
When talking about Scientific Revolution, Copernicus was famous for placing the 
Sun in the centre of the universe in the astronomical field. His new universe retained 
elements of both Aristotelian cosmology and Ptolemaic astronomy.91 For a long time, 
it was believed that Aristotle-Ptolemy cosmological was linked to anthropocentrism. In 
order to explore the intellectual impact of the Copernican Revolution, many scholars 
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held that the understanding of the scientific revolution was anti-Aristotelian, such as 
Peter Dear, Discipline & Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientific 
Revolution, 92  and Steven Shapin, The Scientific Revolution. 93  Peter Dear traced 
mathematical natural philosophy from the sixteenth century to the English 
mathematicians in the late seventeenth century. He argued that “geometrical figures 
were things to be drawn rather than pre-existing in a Platonic realm.”94 
It is generally agreed by Alexandre Koyre ,́ Thomas Kuhn and many modern 
scholars that Copernicus’ heliocentric theory de-centred the earth within the universe 
so that the status of humanity received a severe blow.95 Koyre  ́pointed that Copernicus 
decentred the earth and made it only normal stars in the universe, which destroyed the 
foundation of traditional divine cosmos.96  
The philosopher Hans Blumenberg held a different opinion to Koyre  ́and Kuhn. 
In 1975, he explained in his seminal book The Genesis of the Copernican World that 
the overturning of anthropocentrism was by no means Copernicus’s original intention.97 
For Blumenberg, that Copernicus replaced the earth by the sun was an internal 
adjustment to geocentric cosmology.98 Blumenberg believed that Copernicus reached 
the heart of cosmos explained that what Copernicus did could be considered as a 
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protection against the uncertainties and “Copernicus had concentrated the actual 
movements of the cosmos into the innermost region thereof. This could be considered 
as the paradigm of a gain in immanence, a protection of nature against the uncertainties 
and intrusions of transcendence.”99  Blumenberg used a large number of Classical 
sources to find evidence in late medieval and Renaissance humanism that geocentrism 
did not mean anthropocentrism, and anthropocentrism did not mean geocentrism either. 
He suggested such a connection can only be found in ancient stoicism.100  
In fact, Blumenberg thought Copernicus eliminated the connection between 
anthropocentrism and Aristotelianism and geocentrism. He stated, “The provision of 
the world’s continual ‘energy requirements’ from the outside inward, by way of the 
mediating agency of the heavenly spheres and all the way down to the terrestrial 
processes of coming to be and ceasing to be, would have been incompatible with the 
Copernican implication that the primary motion of the heavens and the path of the Sun 
were illusory.”101 The “central” position of humanity was “idealized” and was no 
longer associated with a particular cosmological picture. Therefore, the primary 
contribution of the Copernican revolution did not lie in the astronomical system or its 
replacement of a geocentric with a heliocentric cosmology, nor in its theological 
challenges.102  
In addition to the developing scientific movement, modern scholars believe that 
Hermetic tradition played a role in the intellectual revolution during these years as well. 
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They both interested in investing the world, searching for knowledge and believing in 
man’s will. These two traditions closely related and positively influenced the general 
acceptance of secular values, though they ultimately went separate ways. There was a 
possibility that this change of heliocentrism conversely enhanced the beliefs of the old 
cosmological model: thus Nicholas Campion believed that Copernicus had been 
inspired by a Hermetic vision that the sun must stand at the centre of the universe.103 
Campion believed that Copernicus followed the Hermetic tradition that a ‘spiritual’ sun 
was the heart of the cosmos. Campion concluded that “it made sense for the [physical 
sun] to occupy the same space as the [spiritual sun].”104 This shows that the Copernicus 
cosmology resembled the traditional divine cosmos, except that he replaced the Earth 
with Sun. Indeed, this change probably enhanced the power of the traditional 
cosmology.  
According to Frances Yates, there was a resurgence of mystic associations for the 
sun in the Renaissance.105 Yates stated, “Copernicus’s quotation from ‘Trismegistus’, 
after his diagram of the Solar System, shows that he had absorbed the Hermetic Sun 
mysticism, combined with Neoplatonism, which was the characteristic philosophy of 
his time.”106 This theory put man’s supposed centrality on a fixed and centred position 
in the universe as Earth used to be. It did not greatly alter the philosophical meaning of 
 
103 Nicholas Campion, A History of Western Astrology, Vol 1, (London: Continuum,2009), p.110. 
104 Campion, A History of Western Astrology, p.110. 
105 Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, p.202. 
106 Frances A. Yates, Selected works. Ideas and ideals in the North European Renaissance, Volume X 
(London: Routledge, 1999), p.259. 
 39 
the old Aristotelian-Ptolemaic cosmology. The Hermetic tradition emphasis a new 
means to seek a defined and created order. 
By moving the Earth out of the centre, Copernicus’s universe conflicted with the 
basis of Aristotelian physics, the division between the terrestrial and celestial regions. 
It also conflicted with the Christian doctrine of the stationary Earth. As a result, most 
sixteenth-century astronomers did not accept the heliocentric hypothesis, but rather 
used Copernicus’s calculations as only a mathematical method in order to correct the 
calendar rather than a revolution in cosmology. As discussed in Chapter one, 
Copernican theory in the Elizabethan era was not yet an accepted system of the world. 
Robert S. Westman notes that no more than ten thinkers between 1543 and 1600 agreed 
with the “main claims” of the heliocentric theory.107 
In November of 1572, an alarming event occurred: a new star appeared in the 
sky.108 According to the belief system of early modem England, such a phenomenon 
was impossible. This was a huge shock to English with a direct question: how could 
something new appear in a supposedly changeless superlunary region of Aristotle’s 
universe. 109  Raphael Holinshed, an early-modern English historian, recorded the 
anxiety over the discovery in his 1587 Chronicles: the appearance of a new star “in 
place celestiall far above the moone” was “so strange, as from the beginning of the 
world never was the like.”110 Johnson noted that the new star “helped to remove one 
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of the chief obstacles to the progress of the Copernican hypothesis,” which was 
Aristotle’s celestial divisions.111  
In 1577, another shocking astronomical event occurred: Tycho discerned that an 
extremely bright comet had appeared in the sky, which must be located beyond the 
Moon’s sphere. 112  This comet raised doubt concerning the existence of the old 
immutable cosmology.  
This paper assumes that what was much more unsettling in the new world system 
was a concept of “plurality of worlds”. This could cause a mixed feeling of anxiety and 
alienation. In this view, separated from the assumption of geocentrism, the possibility 
of a “plurality of worlds” became available in constructing the new worldview. When 
the Copernican revolution challenged the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic system in the early 
modern era, the possibilities of other worlds caused a shift of perspective: humans lost 
a fixed and central position from which to observe the universe.113 There was a crucial 
step in the transformation from earlier thought to the development of humans’ self-
assertion in their relationship with the natural world.  
The central question can be posed thus: in a universe which was proved to be 
infinite, how could humans think and know about the outside world? What could 
humans think, and how could humans come to know anything about the universe in 
which they found themselves? As a result, the natural world would become a dangerous 
place and other disasters would cause a continual fear of death or feeling that the world 
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was beyond human control. H. R. Trevor-Roper in The General Crisis of The 
Seventeenth Century examined intellectual crises, such as fear of the end of the world, 
shared by wider European society during this period.114  
The poetry of John Donne may be cited as symptomatic of an age of “uncertain 
signs”: 
And new Philosophy calls all in doubt, 
The Element of fire is quite put out; 
The Sunne is lost, and th’earth, and no mans wit 
Can well direct him, where to looke for it. 
And freely men confesse, that this world's spent, 
When in the Planets, and the Firmament 
They seeke so many new: they see that this 
Is crumbled out againe to his Atomis; 
‘Tis all in pieces, all cohaerence gone; 
All just supply, and all Relation: 
Prince, Subiect, Father, Sonne, are things forgot, 
For euery man alone thinkes he hath got 
To be a Phoenix, and that there cam bee 
None of that kinde, of which he is, but hee.115 
This poetry showed a general sense of disorder and the breaking down of the 
hierarchical social order.116 It pointed out that the sun and the earth were “lost”, and 
“many new” planets were found in an infinite universe; “atomis in motion” showed the 
mechanical operation of nature; the organism was “all in pieces”; internal qualities were 
replaced by mechanical explanations; “supply”, “relation”. This metaphorical shift 
implicated a full range of imaginative, speculative, and political thought. 
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Another consequence which arose was that supernatural forces played a more 
immediate and important role in societies gaining faith in controlling the environment. 
Keith Thomas in Religion and the Decline of Magic described the prevalence of magic 
and the supernatural in early modern England.117 Yet, Thomas suggested magic and 
astrology declined by the end of the seventeenth century. He explained this by stating 
that: “What really destroyed the possibility of scientific astrology was the undermining 
of the Aristotelian distinction between terrestrial and celestial bodies, what Bacon 
called ‘the imaginary divorce between superlunary and sublunary things.’”118 It is 
suggested that developments in astronomy influenced humans’ views of nature. In order 
to preserve humans’ status and dignity, internal adjustments were made by theologians 
and philosophers in the seventeenth century. This is a very important point which will 
be considered later.  
This transformation can be seen in literature as well. In the early seventeenth 
century, writers wrote with mixed feelings of fear, anxiety and thrill about the other 
worlds. It can be seen again from John Donne’s poetry, An Anatomy of the World: The 
First Anniversary119 and Ignatius His Conclave120, both written in 1611; and Of the 
Progress of the Soul, the Second Anniversary written in 1612.121  In these poems, 
Donne showed his concern about the new universe modified by Copernicus’s followers 
instead of the old Aristotle-Ptolemy cosmos. In addition, he described the new 
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philosophy which threatened to separate the divine cosmos and metaphysical, expanded 
universe.122 
However, in the mid-seventeenth century, the stories of travels to the moon 
became popular and were a way of exploring other possible ways of living. Indeed, 
seventeenth-century astronomer and mathematician Johannes Kepler wrote about just 
such a journey.123 Some thinkers already started to picture colonizing the moon, which 
reflected what Cassirer called the “historical consciousness.”124 Francis Godwin, John 
Wilkins, Athanasius Kircher, Samuel Brown, Ludvig Holberg, and Margaret Cavendish 
are all further examples.  
In Elizabethan England two scholars accepted and developed Copernicus’s theory: 
Thomas Digges and Giordano Bruno. Digges added his 1576 A Perfit Description of 
the Caelestial Orbes to a revision of his father’s Prognostication Everlasting. 
According to Alexandre Koyre´, Digges significantly modified Copernicus’s universe. 
Digges reproduced Copernicus’s original cosmos and added numerous stars beyond 
that final circle. He thus presented an infinite universe.125 Some scholars argued that 
Digges was the first modem astronomer to expand an infinite heliocentric universe 
beyond Copernicus himself.126 
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Bruno also had an influence on English thought. In England, Bruno published six 
of his philosophical/cosmological treatises and supported a universe composed of 
plurality of worlds within an infinite space. 127  In particular, he explicated how 
Copernican theory functioned as the basis for his cosmology in his 1584 On the Infinite 
Universe and Worlds. “There are then innumerable suns, and an infinite number of 
earths revolve around those suns, just as the seven we can observe revolve around this 
sun which is close to us.”128 Unlike the ordered, hierarchical space of either Aristotle’s 
or Copernicus’s cosmos, Bruno’s cosmos is an acentric and homogenous space. 
In 1638, the future English Bishop and founder of the Royal Society of London, 
John Wilkins, wrote in The Discovery of a World that “having read Plutarch, Galileus, 
Kepler, with some others, and finding many of mine own thoughts confirmed by such 
strong authority, I then concluded that it was not only possible there might be, but 
probable that there was another habitable world in that planet.”129 This was a fearless 
suggestion that the universe contains a plurality of worlds. Wilkins explained why this 
conclusion does not contradict the Christian faith.  
Copernicus’s heliocentrism caused both a spatial and theological transformation 
of the universe by generating a new concept of space where humankind is no longer in 
the centre. Wilkins’s work demonstrated the anxieties brought by the possibility of 
plurality of worlds. There was a theological paradox to which Wilkins admitted he has 
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no solution, which was the salvation of extraterrestrial life. If it is human, humans in 
Earth would lose the unique relationship to God which was wrote as a doctrine in 
Christian. Moreover, it could diminish the unique and valuable of Christian salvation 
on Earth. 
Two natural philosophers, Johannes Kepler and Galileo Galilei, further improved 
Copernicus’s view. Kepler’s The Dream, written by 1609, depicted the first Moon-
world in a Copernican universe; and Galileo’s telescopic observations, published as The 
Sidereal Messenger in 1610, verified the similarities between the Earth and the Moon.  
Johannes Kepler published his theory The Dream, or Posthumous Work on Lunar 
Astronomy in 1634. It implicitly denied Aristotle’s single-world universe, since Kepler 
presented a universe comprised of multiple worlds. However, Kepler attempted to 
maintain the centrality of humanity in a plural-worlds universe. Johannes Kepler 
perceived the geometry of the cosmos and viewed the universe in terms of a celestial 
symphony orchestrated by “harmony of the spheres.”130  
Kepler explained that the Earth’s position within this ordered, closed universe 
accounts for its status as the most “noble” of the planets131: “his system of planets, on 
one of which we humans dwell, is located in the very bosom of the world, around the 
heart of the universe, that is, the sun. These arguments will also establish in particular 
that we humans live on the globe which by right belongs to the primary rational creature, 
the noblest of the (corporeal) creatures. ”132 Kepler supposed that this cosmos could 
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show the uniqueness of the Earth and allowed human beings to retain their significance 
in an expanded universe.  
Thus, in the Dissertatio, Kepler proposed that Galileo’s findings did not confirm 
Giordano Bruno’s theory of a universe with plurality of worlds was a relief.133 He 
believed that an infinite universe would be a space without order and cause fear. “If you 
[Galileo] had discovered any planets revolving around one of the fixed stars, there 
would now be waiting for me chains and a prison amid Bruno’s innumerabilities… you 
have for the present freed me from the great fear which gripped me as soon as I had 
heard about your book from my opponent’s triumphal shout.”134 Kepler believed that 
God made this arrangement and the natural world was an expression of Him. Therefore, 
Kepler warned Galileo that he denied multiple solar systems in Bruno’s universe as it 
could cause chaos and disturb God’s plan.  
In fact, Galileo’s Sidereus nuncius included two revolutionary discoveries. The 
first was his description of the surface of the Moon: “Anyone will then understand with 
the certainty of the senses that the Moon is by no means endowed with a smooth and 
polished surface, but is rough and uneven and, just as the face of the Earth itself, 
crowded everywhere with vast prominences, deep chasms, and convolutions.”135 In 
Aristotle’s cosmology, the moon should have appeared perfectly smooth and spherical. 
Instead, it was perceived to be imperfect like the Earth.  
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Galileo’s second discovery was the observation that Jupiter has four moons, which 
he describes as “four planets never seen from the beginning of the world right up to our 
day.”136 It is interesting to note that Galileo assumed these conditions to be natural, 
which was quite different from the old animated cosmos model. Both discoveries 
supported Copernican theory, but they also implicated that all other planets might be 
Earths and thus may contain intelligent life.137 
Later in the century, another prominent figure appeared: René Descartes. Steven 
J. Dick asserted that “Cartesian cosmology played a central role in extending the idea 
of a plurality of Earthlike planets to that of a plurality of solar systems.”138 Arthur O. 
Lovejoy wrote that “even learned authors” gave Descartes “the whole credit” for the 
new cosmology that time.139 Conceptions of an expanded universe had begun to enter 
the English consciousness by the 1640s. As Steven Shapin notes, Cartesian mechanics 
influenced key English natural philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes and Robert 
Boyle.140 
Descartes’ cosmos is a space composed only of matter and motion, which exhibits 
Descartes’ mechanical worldview.141 In Descartes’ body/soul (or mind) dualism, all 
things are composed of either matter or soul. Matter accounts for the physical or natural 
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world. Soul accounts for the nonphysical or “thinking stuff.”142 As a result, Descartes’ 
universe cannot contain a vacuum; it must be a plenum. In his 1644 Principles of 
Philosophy, Descartes describes the physical nature of a universe full with particles and 
each vortex had a centre.143 Descartes identified each vortex with a Copernican solar 
system, which means each had a central Sun surrounded by its own planets. Descartes 
replaced the “animistic explanation of the motion of the spheres” with “a purely 
mechanical impulsion.”144 The planets rotate not because of an internal innate force, 
but because of the physical nature of the construct of the universe.145  
Yet, Descartes keeps God central with his mechanical explanation for planetary 
motion. Descartes believed that “the motion of bodies in the world derive[d] directly 
from God himself.”146 Descartes himself claimed, “there are as many different vortices 
as there are now stars in the world.”147 Consequently Descartes presented a universe 
with a potentially infinite number of solar systems, though he did not state his belief in 
either an infinite universe or a plurality of worlds. Because he thought “infinite” can 
apply only to God.148 Despite this, Descartes’ theory arguably provides the basis for 
such a universe. 
 Furthermore, for Descartes, space and matter are the same thing, and therefore a 
vacuum is an impossibility. Descartes’ universe, in effect, is infinitely extended and 
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thus composed of an infinite number of solar systems. Moreover, Descartes believed in 
the “uniformity of Nature’s laws”; the laws of Nature are essentially the same across 
the universe, since the universe is composed of the same material throughout.149 No 
wonder that the Queen of Sweden Christina observed that Descartes’s cosmology could 
lead to the belief that “all these stars have inhabitants” and perhaps even that “they have 
earths around them.”150 
The early influence of Descartes in England is particularly evident in the work of 
Henry More. It is believed that More was the first to introduce Cartesian thought to 
England. More’s 1646 poem Democritus Platonissans, or An Essay upon the Infinity of 
Worlds out of Platonick Principles was likely one of the first published discussions of 
Descartes’ philosophy in England.151 Descartes’ cosmology underlies the entire poem. 
More wrote on the preface that “Epicurus, Democritus, Lucretius” as well as “That 
sublime and subtill Mechanick […], Descartes.”152  
Then More affirmed the infinity of worlds in infinite space: “These [planets] with 
their suns I severall worlds do call, Whereof the number I deem infinite: Else infinite 
darknesse were in this great Hall Of th’ endlesse Universe; But if that infinite Suns we 
shall admit, Then infinite worlds follow in reason right.”153 More’s poem indicated that 
Descartes’ philosophy was entering the English consciousness. Influenced by Descartes’ 
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cosmology, More “enthusiastically urged upon the English-speaking world the belief 
in an infinite number of inhabited planets” in an infinite space.154 Lovejoy concluded 
that it was likely the “Cartesianism led to “the rapidly growing acceptance of the 
theories of the plurality and infinity of worlds in the second half of the seventeenth 
century.”155 
However, the mechanical worldview with an infinite universe could cause a threat 
to theology. Matter becomes passive without active, internal forces. More found that 
“the Cartesian world in practice excluded spirits and souls.”156 Descartes’ universe 
seems to deny Aristotelian final cause, the God’s greater purpose for the universe. 
Shapin notes that Descartes in fact “formally banished talk of final causes from his 
natural philosophy.” 157  The expanded universe with a plurality of worlds has the 
potential to be a disordered world. Since the English conception of the expanded 
universe was connected to Descartes’ cosmology, it seems reasonable that Thomas 
Hobbes could follow this universe. It is a mechanical world that seems to lack the 
absolute monarch, God.  
Political Thinking Before Thomas Hobbes  
Twentieth-century theorists like T. S. Kuhn used paradigm theory to explain the 
scientific revolution. There are basic values and beliefs in sustaining the paradigm. 
Kuhn asserted that the usual response to the initial conceptual breakdown in the old 
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paradigm is conservative. Efforts are made to validate and revalidate the traditional 
ordering of things. In this way, the initial breakdown is overlooked, and the causes of 
disorder are disregarded. Only later when a new ordering of things emerges, and only 
after sufficient battle, then a new paradigm can be created.158  
The understanding of values, paradigms and paradigm shifts is about explaining 
changes in the scientific world along with the political world. An analysis of this shift 
linking these two areas lies in the transformation in the basic conceptions. 159 
Conceptions of the self, of society, and of the larger cosmos which was extended to an 
infinite universe and of the relationships among all of these, describe a new idea of 
political order. 
The ancient Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle successfully constructed the 
metaphysics of cosmos by eliminating infinite space and the possibility of a plurality 
of worlds.160 In the Middle Ages, the concept of infinity was a paradox. On the one 
hand, infinity was combined with the concept of the omnipotence of God. On the other 
hand, an infinite universe with a plurality of worlds could demote the unique place of 
the human being.161 The reappearance of infinity in a positive form because of the 
scientific revolution was destructive to the old system.  
Without this “organic and hierarchical interpretation of system” as described, the 
traditional world view “precluded any sort of independent political aspiration or 
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initiative.” and had become foundationless.162 General concern and discussion about 
the relationship between law, authority and sovereignty increased. At the same time, 
theorists started gradually to think about the relationship between public, social values 
and private desires. Different political theories advanced innovative concepts of order 
and authority and began to define a political and a conceptual relationship between 
order and secular sovereignty.  
As Walzer has argued “The changing nature of the political world was, however, 
paralleled by changes in the conception of the cosmos. . . These changes in the view of 
God and his universe had many sources. Calvinism was among the most important.”163 
Walzer tried to find a reason for the dissolution of the traditional, hierarchical view of 
things in the Puritans’ ubiquitous involvement in Sin and the Fall; it “produced 
descriptions of chaos which sounded very much like Hobbes’ view of nature. And if 
chaos were natural, there was no great chain.”164  
Indeed, in the old divine Christian cosmos, the view was one of an unchanging 
political order in which “politics ought never to be the concern of private men.”165 The 
cosmic chaos resulted in basic values about man, society, God and the cosmos being 
challenged consciousness. Walzer argued that the Puritan politics reacted against this 
chaos;166 this thesis assumed that the basis of Hobbes’ new secular sovereignty started 
from this cosmic chaos. Early in his career, Hobbes argued “the estate of men in . . . 
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natural liberty is the estate of war.”167 The state of “war” (chaos) was the starting point 
of Hobbes’s political legitimacy and the political nature of man. 
The consciousness of practical and efficient order supported new conceptions of 
man and state during the middle years of the seventeenth century. Even for those who 
accepted the Copernican universe, epistemological consequences could not be foreseen. 
Once the earth became only one of many planets it would lose its distinct status with 
the heavens and the hierarchy would devalue. Man, decentered with the earth, must 
search for a new place in the cosmos.  
During the first half of the seventeenth century, King James I, Edward Forset, and 
Sir Robert Filmer were famous for articulating the divine right theory, which accorded 
with the organic and hierarchical cosmology. The divine right theory grew in response 
to a practical necessity rather than intellectual activity. Theories of divine right grew to 
refute the control of religion over royal sovereignty.168 It might be useful to understand 
this concept as an innovative response to the breakdown in the traditional order, and 
consequently related in terms of theories of popular responsibility and sovereignty. 
King James suggested to his Parliament in 1609, “if you wil consider the Attributes 
to God, you shall see how they agree in the person of a King.”169 Kings are divine 
because they are like God who rules the whole universe by natural hierarchy. 
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Additionally, James believed that kings ruled the country as the father ruled his family 
and the head of the body politic in microcosm.170 From this, James argued that kings 
are accountable to God. James maintains that God’s law was perfect and ultimately 
fixed and all laws derived from it.171 Therefore the King’s authority for order and his 
power from a divine ordination. 
Edward Forset published A Comparative Discourse of the Bodies Natural and 
Politique to support the divine right theory. Borrowing from the cosmology of Pico, 
Bruno and John Dee, who suggested that God’s full, created universe was infinite and 
various. Forset established the political order that transcended traditional hierarchies 
and defined man’s place in both the natural and the political orders. He wrote in the 
introduction that “In the very composure of man, there is manifestly discovered a 
summary abstract of absolute perfection, by the which as by an excellent Idea, or an 
exact rule, we may examine and exemplifie all other things.” 172  The relationship 
between man and the cosmos still existed, but this is a new way of admitting man’s 
responsibility for discovering order. Man’s chosen purpose was to interpret God’s 
cosmos by discovering natural relationships. “It is the greatest miracle of God's 
powerfull wisdome, in the innumerable frames of things to make infinite variation; then 
it must needs be a great work of the wit of man, in such multiplicitie of differance to 
find out the well agreeing resemblences.”173 Men created political order by imitating 
and by establishing a fixed order which resembled God’s natural order. 
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 Forest advanced a traditional theory of order which required the dynamic 
exercising of self-consciousness and of individual responsibility. He did not use 
theological argument, instead, he based his theory of order upon a modified cosmology 
of Pico, Bruno and John Dee. In so doing, he tied the purpose of order more tightly to 
temporal definition, but restricted it to an organic cycle.  
The awareness of change and alteration and the possibilities of infinite universe 
intensified. For instance, Raleigh believed that “There is nothing exempt from the Peril 
of Mutation; the Earth, Heavens, and the Whole World is thereunto subject.”174 The 
whole world, including even Heavens, decay was destiny. This is a clear difference 
from the old Christian cosmos. Theorists rarely think about the state from the first 
causes and principles because the primary task was what a state can provide. Apparently, 
there is a parallel between changes in political philosophy and natural philosophy 
during these years.  
Unlike James, Forset, or Raleigh, Bacon seems to see politics and political theories 
more practical. Within the tradition of the Renaissance Neoplatonic cosmology, Bacon 
saw that “matter is in a perpetual flux, and never at a stay.”175 Bacon admitted that 
change was endless, but man could manage to order change. Bacon complemented a 
full materialistic cosmos. Besides, he derived his idea of the state and order from this 
understanding. Bacon found his way in Neoplatonic-Hermetic tradition associated with 
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Pico. 176  He emphasised the study of the full cosmos which were wisdom and 
knowledge from ancients. By combining knowledge and wisdom within the finite and 
mysterious cosmos, Bacon attempted to recover order, especially state and social order.  
Yet Bacon tried to define the secular world rather than a transcendental purpose. 
He understood that the centre of man’s life in the secular world is to construct a system 
of order, just as the traditional theorists had defined and mythologized the divine 
cosmos around which their lives revolved. The traditional arguments about order and 
degree were used to construct the security of society. In this respect, Bacon smoothed 
the way to a rational consciousness of self that Hobbes used to his political definition. 
Throughout his Essays, Bacon, like Hobbes, advocated a careful appraisal of one’s 
nature which led to success in temporal endeavours. He asserted that habits and actions 
were the best means of understanding politics and business.177 For Bacon, “…the well 
understanding and discerning of a man’s self” was a prerequisite to involve in the 
secular world.178  
In agreement with Bacon, Tuvil realized that an understanding of man’s nature 
facilitated the successful consummation of individual endeavours. But he recognized 
that to gain true and certain knowledge of man was extremely hard and difficult.179 He 
noted that man could not judge things according to preconceived ideas of justice, or 
expect things always to be reasonable. His understanding of the relationship between 
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passions, will and reason undermines the concept of right reason and required purpose 
and ultimate ends of private and public activity. 
Tuvil based his account of political theory upon a psychology of human ethics 
which indicated Hobbesian insights in many places. 
 “Passions are certaine internal acts, and operations of our soul, which being joyned 
and linked in a most inviolable, and long continued friendship with the sensitive power, 
and facultie thereof, doe conspire together like disobedient and rebelious subjects, to 
shake off the yoake of Reason, and exempt themselves from her commaund & 
controlement, that they may still exercise those disordered motions, in this contract 
world of our frayle and humaine bodies.”180  
The internal motivations which directed man’s actions was the knowledge of self. This 
kind of knowledge led to the knowledge of society. For Turvil, this showed that man 
become the primary consideration in a world motive behaviour influenced political 
world. Therefore, it is clear that he abandoned the body politic and the human body 
correspondent to natural order and divinity. Earlier than Hobbes’ concepts of “appetites” 
and “aversions,” Turvil realised that man’s behaviour was motivated by simple internal 
passions rather than external defined purposes. “Tis eyther hope of Reward, or feare of 
Punishment, that in the attempt of things, orders and directs our choyce.”181 
The understanding of the particular and the purposive nature of man needs to re-
evaluate the foundation for action, behaviour, value, and purpose. Man’s concept of 
himself and his understanding of his relationship to external world could cause chaos 
in political order. Man had to take responsibility for his own actions.182 The identity 
was no longer secured by cosmic correspondence. Instead, man had to find value for 
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himself in the secular world; and to do this he had to work to establish similar self-
defined ends for man and for society. Otherwise, man would experience emotional 
isolation and uncertainty in order. 
However, it is a difficult task to combine self with political order. Seventeenth-
century theorists faced a dilemma. One the one hand, they had a mixed feeling towards 
the self-consciousness: both proud and feared. The best example of this feeling 
probably was in the works of Shakespeare. On the other hand, the private and 
commonwealth needed a new relationship.183 In this respect, Hobbes believes that 
good and bad actions were similarly motivated and all cause and effect emanated from 
the one nature; consequently, to secure order in a changing world could not only 
depended on moral codes. Therefore, it was necessary to address the definition and 
limitations of sovereignty, namely the order in a changing secular world. Hobbes 
provided a conservative cosmological foundation for a developed self-consciousness, a 
new understanding of the power and limits of knowledge, and a changed view of nature 
to help shape and boundaries. 
The new cosmological system defines the relationship between self and society 
which generally altered the traditional divine cosmos. As was the case with changes in 
political theories, these alterations interest in man’s will and were often inspired by 
religious and philosophical traditions that gained structural definition from the divine 
cosmos. Divinity had most perfectly accomplished this unity in nature.  
The cosmos that magicians and philosophers worked in and contemplated 
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resembled that of the traditional order.184 However, it functioned to celebrate human 
possibilities that transcended these same structural natures. It investigated the world; 
the search for knowledge and the concern with the power of knowledge characterized 
the English imagination and the English political world during these years. Man could 
imitate divinity and could attain the divine knowledge of this unity in love or by 
properly understanding nature and operating in it. 
Changing conceptions about nature, knowledge, magic, and science characterized 
the profound emphasis on political order and provided some theorists with viable means 
with which to confront a social world to defend by change. Then it arouses a new 
problem: the ability to tap the reforming power of knowledge depended on the method 
used to gain knowledge.185 It served as a bridge to connect man and knowledge. The 
proper inquiry into nature reformed man and emancipated him from the limits of his 
perspective. He was then capable of redefining society according to its natural 
investigation ability. 
In this regard, Bacon paved a way for Hobbes. For Bacon, knowledge was a useful 
tool for man to manipulate and direct nature. As did so many of his contemporaries, he 
continually struggled with questions of permanence and change; and his ordered 
universe contained eternal matter which was ever in flux. Bacon declared “the true ends 
of knowledge is for the benefit and use of life.”186 The reform of knowledge would be 
the effective cause of the reform of political world. By careful observation, man could 
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participate in nature’s essential order and resurrect the natural union of mind and nature. 
His method for knowing resembled Hobbes’: “Those however who aspire not to 
guess and divine, but to discover and know; who propose not to devise mimic and 
fabulous worlds of their own, but to examine and dissect the nature of this very world 
itself: must go to the facts themselves for everything.”187 Bacon believed that man’s 
mind could reflect reality and conceive order, but man shall destroy the false knowledge 
and worlds. Then Bacon believed that “wedlock of mind and universe” recur.188 Bacon 
criticized the ancient opinion that man was a microcosm by exaggerating the 
correspondences and parallels with the macrocosm.189  
Bacon did not praise first cause as the traditional theorists did, but defined order 
as a simple existence of unchanging physical laws. As Bacon stated: “Towards the 
effecting of works, all that man can do is to put together or put asunder natural 
bodies.”190 This was an important insight because it allowed man to define things. In 
this regard, Bacon conservatively rejected traditional notions of nature’s autonomy over 
order, and prefigured the new concepts concerning nature, society and order. Hobbes 
articulates this point which will be discussed later. The understanding of nature and of 
man helped define a new idea of order which no longer described a divine cosmos 
corresponding to man’s microcosm; rather, the order was social reality itself, shaped 
and framed by human will and action. 
Finally, Bacon’s world was a fully material, finite and changing universe. Bacon 
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asserted that natural philosophy turned to human affairs and conditioned the ideas of 
harmony, virtue and peace in man. Since natural philosophy “teaches the peoples to 
assemble and unite and take upon them the yoke of laws and submit to authority, and 
forget their ungoverned appetites.”191 
With Hobbes, Bacon understood that order was necessary. Unlike the old divine 
cosmos which asserted that disorder was unnatural, it is a struggle for Bacon to admit 
that both order and disorder were natural. Bacon claimed that civilization flourishes and 
decays like nature; then rebellions break out and finally “according to the appointed 
vicissitude of things,” civilization again arises” not in the places where they were 
before. 192  For Bacon, nature created a conceptual order; while for Hobbes, man 
contrived a material order for himself. Bacon’s order was not definitive as Hobbes’s, 
rather it participated in the natural flux of things. 
This examines the cosmological background of Hobbes’ concept of nature and 
man. Under the background of the infinite universe with the possibilities of a plurality 
of worlds, intellectual thinking no longer accepted natural hierarchy and intrinsic 
interdependence. If the new universe is a chaotic space, then the consequence is an 
endless dispute over the location of authority. The American historian Perez Zagorin 
argued that “Two revolutions occurred in England before 1688: a political revolt against 
Charles I, which began with the Long Parliament and had to be fought out in a civil 
war; and an intellectual transformation that led, later in the seventeenth century, to the 
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enthronement of science and its secular interests among the controlling cultural forces 
of the age.”193 Was that these two revolutions happened during the same period a 
coincidence? If England were a microcosm of the universe, the Civil War would signify 
the result of lack of order. Thus, the restoration of order resumed the political 
uncertainties of England. 
The doctrine of Humanism assumed that the whole universe was made for humans, 
but did not require that Earth should be located at the centre anymore. The position at 
the physical centre was not necessary in showing the importance and glory of human 
beings. Due to the homogeneity of the universe, what applied to the heavens could also 
apply to the earth, and vice versa. There were possibilities that human beings were able 
to use reason to find purpose and God’s intention was hidden in the natural world.  
Indeed, basic concepts such as “order,” and “nature” were redefined in the process 
of the scientific revolution’s ferment of new knowledge. Accordingly, the conception 
of an animate cosmos was succeeded by the view that the world was subjected to the 
laws of nature. With the unitary divine cosmos lost, everyone was isolated and impotent. 
In order to reduce the consequent possibility of chaos and fear, it was necessary to 
create a new order. Theories of the nature of man and theories of the nature of the 
cosmos were in confusion. Human personality and character had long been interpreted 
in terms in which the world and the universe were described. Thus, the collapse of this 
classical cosmic order gave way to an open view of the universe, which evoked a 
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growing awareness of humans’ self-consciousness. Human beings produced the new 
image of the universe and determined the meaning of nature and history. 
After what has been discussed in chapters one and two, these two parts indicated 
in detail how the nature and significance of the cosmological shift transformed from 
the Middle Ages to seventeenth-century England. A lot of scholars have noticed and 
their works broadly explained this change in many aspects, such as literature, science, 
religion and philosophy. Steven Shapin, Paul Kocher, Edward Grant, John Russell and 
Francis Johnson, are scientific historians whose works mainly focused on the history of 
the scientific revolution. They described the cosmological challenge to the geocentric 
model from a scientific perspective. It is about the transformation of natural science 
from a philosophical and religious by-product to a practical and secular subject. Their 
work made a solid foundation for this thesis. They collected and analysed the works of 
Copernicus, Bruno, Galileo, Kepler, Diggs and many “scientists” at that time, which is 
useful and helpful literature. Though they noticed the influence of scientific revolution 
on other aspects，a few of them linked it with political theory. 
 One of the scientific historians, Thomas Kuhn, concluded this cosmological 
change in his paradigm and used it to explain the intellectual revolution. He claimed 
that if everything was in cosmological crisis at the same time, then it could bring out a 
new paradigm. Under the new paradigm, humans deal with the relationship with self, 
nature, and world in a new way. This thesis has agreed with Kuhn that political thought 
was influenced by this cosmological crisis as well and shared the same concern with 
other regions. 
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E.M.W Tillyard and Marjorie Nicolson analysed the transformation of cosmology 
in literature. They described a clear process by which literature went through a different 
expression and perspective. Their limitation is that they did not use more convincing 
evidence than English drama. Steven Dick and Alexandre Koyre  ́ focused on the 
concept of “plurality of worlds” in an infinite universe. The former concentrated on the 
philosophical part while the latter paid attention to the scientific part. They both noticed 
that the concept of “plurality of worlds” made a huge impact on human perspectives. 
Their limitation is that they did not consider the construction of order under this concept. 
This thesis based on their works tries to show the influence on a political order within 
the perspective of human change. 
Ernst Cassirer, Arthur Lovejoy and Rémi Brague are philosophers who connected 
philosophical thinking with cosmology, especially concerning the “human place” in 
this theme. Their work is enlightening in ancient and Renaissance cosmology 
respectively. But they did not examine cosmology in the seventeenth century and their 
focus was mainly on Europe rather than on England. The intellectual revolution indeed 
started in Europe; however, this thesis assumes that the theorists in England were not 
behind. Instead, they knew and learned the new knowledge from Europe and they 
developed practical means to solve the crisis. This thesis suggests that political thought 
in England had a connection with the cosmological transformation and theorists made 
contributions to constructing a political order in accord with the new infinite universe.   
Thomas Hobbes received a humanist education and was familiar with traditional 
knowledge. At the same time, Hobbes had a relationship with Galileo, Descartes and 
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Bacon. He paid close attention to their new knowledge. He lived during a transitional 
age experiencing the nature and influence of cosmological shift. It is hard to believe 
that any of Hobbes’s thought was not related to it, though he is not directly portrayed 
in this context. In sum, many scholars have noticed the cosmological challenge in the 
seventeenth century generally. Most of them focused on the philosophical aspect 
concerning concepts like nature or “self”. In some respects, political order is a reflection 
of the practical use of these concepts. Therefore, this thesis aims to use Thomas Hobbes 
as a case study to show how Hobbes illustrates the new way of thinking about politics 















Chapter Three: Construction of Order 
Thomas Hobbes and Cosmology 
Major intellectuals of the late sixteenth century and the seventeenth century Europe 
were trained as “humanists”. Thomas Hobbes was no exception. He learned Latin, 
Greek and the rest of the Renaissance curriculum at a grammar school. At school, he 
mastered translation skills which accompanied him for his whole life. In fact, his first 
published book was a translation of Thucydides, and the Odyssey was one of the last 
publications he translated into English. Scholars suggested that Thucydides enabled 
Hobbes to articulate his objection to democracy: “[he] pointed out how inadequate 
democracy is, and how much wiser one man in than multitude.”194 After graduating 
from Oxford, he found a job in the Cavendish household acting as secretary, tutor and 
advisor.  
Between 1610 and 1615, Hobbes accompanied Lord Cavendish’s son, also named 
William, as his tutor on a tour in Europe. In addition to this trip, he also took a similar 
journey around Europe in 1630. When he returned to England in 1631, he became 
acquainted with the “Welbeck Academy”, a group interested in natural science, such as 
mathematics, astronomy and mechanics.195 William Cavendish commissioned Hobbes 
to buy a copy of Galileo’s Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief Systems of the World 
that was published in 1632, which was a foundation work of modern physics. Hobbes 
recorded this primary task, “My first businesse in London, was to seeke for Galileos 
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dialogues.”196 After that, Hobbes seemingly got involved in these “scientific” concerns 
and obtained an invitation to meet Galileo himself. In 1634, Hobbes accompanied 
William Cavendish to Paris and met Mersenne’s circle. In summary, these tours gave 
Hobbes an opportunity to meet politicians and intellectuals through Europe and became 
aware of the complexities of modern physics and metaphysics.197  
As was written above, it is reasonable to suppose that Hobbes started his 
philosophical enquiries in the late 1630s because he was intrigued by modern natural 
science. Douglas points out that it was around 1635 that Hobbes began to apply 
mechanism to mind and sensation.198 According to Frithiof Brandt, Hobbes’ bias in 
favour of the circular motion was derived from Galileo.199 In Galileo’s Dialogue on 
the Two Chief Systems of the World (1632), Salviati says:  
“If such a motion [rectilinear] belonged by nature to a body, then from the beginning it 
would not be in its natural place; hence the ordering of the world’s parts would not be 
a perfect one. We assume however, that the ordering of the world is perfect; 
consequently, it cannot by nature be intended to change place, nor consequently, can it 
be intended to move in a straight line.”200  
Hobbes agreed with Galileo that a circle was perfect and it was an appropriate form for 
motion in the cosmos. He spoke highly of Galileo and believed that motion theory was 
one of Galileo’s achievements. “Galileus in our time… was the first that opened to us 
the gate of natural philosophy universal, which is the knowledge of the nature of 
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motion.” 201  Brandt concluded that “It is to Hobbes as to Galileo, a fundamental 
principle that “by nature” there exist revolving motions.”202 It is clear that Hobbes was 
a supporter of Galileo’s new physics in the form of the mechanical universe. As Hobbes 
put it,  
“but the universe, that is, the whole mass of things that are, is corporeal, that is to say, 
body; and hath the dimensions of magnitude, namely length, breadth and depth. Every 
part of the universe is ‘body’ and that which is not ‘body’ is no part of the universe, and 
because the universe is all, that which is no part of it is nothing, and consequently 
nowhere.”203  
Agreeing with Galileo, Hobbes views the universe as “body” which consisted of 
different parts. The universe was no longer a symbol of animation, but a self-moving 
machine. This machine was in defined proper sense of the world and consisted of 
different parts. Bacon asserted that in his book The Advancement of Learning, “the same 
phenomenon in astronomy is satisfied by the received astronomy of the diurnal motion 
and proper motions of the planets, and likewise by the theory of Copernicus who 
supposed the earth to move; and the calculations are indifferently agreeable to both.”204 
The earth lost its unique central position and was one part in an infinite universe. Like 
other planets, the earth equally obeyed natural laws of matter in motion.205  
Hobbes was inspired by Galileo’s idea that the universe was motivated by natural 
forces rather than divine causes, therefore he believed that the state was made to work 
 
201 Thomas Hobbes, English Works of Thomas Hobbes, ed.by, Sir William Molesworth, 11volumes 
(London: Bart. John Bohn, 1839-1845), Vol.1, p.viii. 
202 Quoted from Mintz, Samuel I. “Galileo, Hobbes, and the Circle of Perfection.” Isis, vol. 43, no. 2, 
1952, pp. 98–100.  
203 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiastical 
and Civil (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1946), p.482. 
204 Francis Bacon, The Works of Francis Bacon, Lord Chancellor of England: With A Life of the Author 
by Basil Montagu, ESQ, 3 vols (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 1844), p.200. 
205 Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution, p.1. 
 69 
mechanically like the universe. Like the celestial body, the machinery of the state 
should be tightly regulated and kept in good working order. But Descartes pointed out 
a failing of Galileo’s work, telling Mersenne that “Galileo has not examined things in 
order and that, without considering the first cause of nature, he has only sought to 
account for some particular effects, and thus that he has built without foundation.”206 
Descartes noted that the old order was inefficient to accord with the new cosmological 
thoughts. It was necessary for theorists to build a new order like the divine cosmos 
order, otherwise it was only physical or astronomical effects. 
By 1636, Hobbes had met various French mathematicians and philosophers, such 
as Pierre Gassendi and Martin Mersenne. In that time, Mersenne was the only channel 
of communication with René Descartes since Descartes was hiding in the Netherlands, 
and Mersenne put the two in touch. In 1637, Descartes published his famous book A 
Discourse on the Method for Rightly Conducting the Reason and Searching for Truth 
in the Sciences. To understand Hobbes and Descartes’ comparable arguments, it is 
necessary to understand on what Descartes insisted. Descartes answered this question 
with his famous Cartesian “ego”: I think, therefore I am. Descartes separated the human 
mind from its own perceptions, and thus it witnessed them as observers witness events 
outside themselves.207  
In order to establish foundations for replacing late Renaissance philosophical 
thought with a new philosophy accommodated with new natural science, Hobbes wrote 
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De Corpore in 1655 and De Homine in 1658 concerning the basis of metaphysics and 
physics. Hobbes described the principle of circular motion from Descartes in De 
Corpore, “whatsoever is moved, will always be moved on in the same way and with 
the same velocity, except it be hindered by some other contiguous and moved body.”208  
In this book, Hobbes replaced Copernicus’ motions of the earth towards sun to a 
simple inertial motion, and thus provided a different picture of the universe. With the 
rising view of the mechanical universe, Hobbes attempted to integrate the mechanics 
and matter theory into a complete cosmological theory. Unlike other purely natural 
philosophers, his vision started from natural philosophical considerations while 
proceeding in other areas. Applying pure “scientific” procedures to different areas such 
as politics, theology and morality was potentially radical because it could lead to 
heterodox consequences.209  
Though accepting Descartes’ proposition to some extent, Hobbes thought rather 
differently from the sceptical Descartes. He believed that humans’ own thoughts were 
the product of a physical process within the universe. In Hobbes’s early draft of De 
Corpore, he wrote,  
“If we conceive the world annihilated except one man to whom there would remain 
ideas and images of all the things he had seen, or perceived by his other senses…all 
which though in truth they would be only ideas and phantasms internally happening 
and falling to the imaginant himself, nevertheless they would appear as if they were 
external and not depending upon the power or virtue of mind.”210  
Hobbes propounded a number of metaphysical propositions which are important 
in his political and psychological theories as well. The most important one was motion 
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theory. Hobbes developed an elaborate philosophical system that defined the operations 
of nature as the dynamic forces of particles in motion. In Hobbes’s ethical and political 
works, such as The Elements of Law, he assumed the theory of motion as the foundation. 
Sensation is one of Hobbes’ central philosophical concepts. The name of the first 
chapter of Leviathan is “Of Sense.” The form and motion of Mechanically-interacting 
particles determines the motions of natural phenomena that are detected by our senses. 
Hobbes believed that “Whatsoever accidents or qualities our senses make us think 
there be in the world, they are not there, but are seemings and apparitions only. The 
things that really are in the world without us, are those motions by which these seemings 
are caused.”211 Hobbes argued that what we think we saw was the prevalence of optical 
illusion. Humans perceive images with our sense; however, it does not suppose that the 
thing seen is really as we think it is. Hobbes’s man alone in the universe would thus be 
able to think of himself, however, he could not perceive anything doing the thinking. 
In other words, he could not discern what is really to be found in an external universe. 
He lacks the ability to discern whether everything he perceives is imaginary or not.212 
Moreover, Hobbes wrote in order to object to Descartes’ Meditations, “Although 
someone may think that he was thinking (for this thought is simply an act of 
remembering), it is quite impossible for him to think that he is thinking, or to know that 
he is knowing. For then an infinite chain of questions would arise. How do you know 
that you know that you know?”213 In Hobbes’s world, the new infinite universe consists 
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of homogeneous materials and in an endlessly-motion state, which was neither had 
intrinsic purpose or order. He applied this theory of motion in mind as well. 
In Hobbes’s thinking, reason consisted purely of mechanical effects brought about 
by material objects. In this regard, human beings’ “self” can hardly have “free” will. 
This theory of Hobbes also concerns a Cartesian problem, which is about dreaming. 
Descartes was troubled by the doubt that everything which humans experience while 
awake might merely be a dream. As Hobbes said in the Elements of Law,  
“Nor is it impossible for a man to be so far deceived, as when his dream is past, to think 
it real: for if he dream of such things as are ordinarily in his mind, and in such order as 
he useth to do waking, and withal that he laid him down to sleep in the place where he 
findeth himself when he awaketh (all which may happen) I know no criterion or mark 
by which he can discern whether it were a dream or not …”214 
The second sentence shows that there is actually something outside us, which consist 
of “motions”. This was a widespread view in the seventeenth century, and it raised a 
new question: what is the actual character of the external world and of our relationship 
to it. Seventeenth-century natural philosophy turned to atomism and related theories for 
its explanations of the created order. Most notably in the works of Hobbes and 
Descartes, an atomistic explanation of nature was put forward in forceful arguments 
that was considered dangerous.215 Hobbes’s mechanical materialism was particularly 
dangerous, for it did not separate God from, or place Him above, the created laws of 
motion.216  
It inevitably involves the problem of the first cause of motion. Hobbes’s alleged 
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endorsements of the cosmological argument are as follows: 
“For he that from any effect he seeth come to pass should reason to the next and 
immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plunge himself 
profoundly into the pursuit of causes, shall at last come to this: that there must be (even 
as the heathen philosophers confessed) one first mover, that is, a first and eternal cause 
of all things, which is that which men mean by the name of God.”217 
Hobbes believed that humans are driven by curiosity and a “love of the knowledge”. 
His inquiry into the causes of natural phenomena is limited. “Curiosity, or love of the 
knowledge of causes, draws a man from consideration of the effect to seek the 
cause,…whereof there is no former cause, but is eternal, which is it men call God.” 218 
This indicates that Hobbes started to think about the internal motivations, and tried to 
consider order within this different cosmological system.  
On the one hand, Hobbes thought that ideas and images derived from the content 
of sense perception. As he explained that, “the cause of sense, is the external body, or 
object, which presseth the organ proper to each sense… causeth there a resistance, or 
counter-pressure, or endeavour of the heart, to deliver itself.”219 On the other hand, he 
also answered the question of the possible temporal infinity of the world. In contrast to 
what was held widely during the scientific revolution, Hobbes suggested that the human 
mind constructs our understanding of the world and this kind of mind is finite and 
limited. 
 Unlike Descartes, Hobbes denied that finite human beings have the ability to 
conceive of the infinite. Indeed, Hobbes held an objective attitude to the concept of 
infinity: “And although this word infinite signify a conception of the mind, yet it follows 
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not that we have any conception of an infinite thing.”220 Moreover, he rejected any 
attempt to conceive of infinite things. “yet he will not be able to proceed eternally, but 
wearied will at last give over, without knowing whether it were possible for him to 
proceed to an end or not.”221 To Hobbes, it is impossible to settle the question, because 
“whether we suppose the world to be finite or infinite, no absurdity will follow.”222  
Generally speaking, Hobbes argued that humans were not able to understand 
universal concepts but singular properties of objects.223 As he wrote in Leviathan, 
“some names are common to many things, nothing in the world universal but names; 
for the things named, are every one of them Individual and Singular.”224 This view was 
also related to the rise of a broader sceptical tradition which includes Descartes and 
Mersenne.  
Indeed, Hobbes’s nominalism was a more radical position in terms of all kinds of 
knowledge. This resulted in Hobbes emphasizing that only geometry was a reliable tool 
to demonstrate the order of the universe.225 He believed that “Geometry therefore is 
demonstrable, for the lines and figures from which we reason are drawn and described 
by ourselves”226 This led Hobbes to develop a materialist geometry based on the theory 
of motion. Hobbes originally defined this geometry as “analysis by motions or the 
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method of motion.”227  
To this extent, Hobbes wrote, “The paths of motions simpliciter (in which 
geometry consists) ought to be investigated in the first place, and then the paths of 
motions generated and obvious, and finally the paths of motion internal and invisible 
(which physicists study).”228 Geometry was to him a genuine science that properly 
represented nature. Pycior believed that Hobbes put geometry and language under the 
same principle: they were human constructions with the experiences of individual sense, 
rather than eternal truths.229 
Then a question arose: why Hobbes chose geometry rather than any other science 
and how it served Hobbes’s purpose. In fact, geometry for Hobbes was the basis of an 
entire cosmology.230  It has been suggested that Hobbes did not trust the inherent 
capacity of the human mind, rather the constructed knowledge drawn from experience. 
Certainty came from humanity’s construction of objects’ meanings and gradually 
developed as conventional definitions.231  This caused a far-reaching outcome that 
Hobbes eliminated the importance of original causes. According to Hobbes, only in 
pure mathematics can there be certainty, because the physical world no longer shows 
causes to our understanding as the old divine cosmos did. Thus, “geometry is maker’s 
knowledge, since its certainty is grounded in our construction of the objects known.”232 
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Therefore, Hobbes’s Leviathan is constructed on a geometric rule. 
In Hobbes’s view, Galileo had produced the foundation of a cosmology. Hobbes 
saw mathematics and geometry not as science but a method to reveal the form of motion. 
Galileo solved the problem of motion by abstract geometry and put forward the law of 
physics that bodies would keep moving unless stopped by an outside source. As Hobbes 
explained:  
“the science of every subject is derived from precognition of the causes, generation, 
and construction of the same; and consequently, where the causes are known, there is a 
place for demonstration, but not where the causes are to seek for. Geometry therefore 
is demonstrable, for the lines and figures from which we reason are drawn and described 
by ourselves.”233  
Therefore, Hobbes’s philosophy can be seen as constructivism. By doing this, Hobbes 
transformed the question of the possible temporal infinity of the world to one of the 
uses of mechanics. Hobbes asserted the mechanical and mathematical of movement 
was a revelation of the nature of the universe. Hobbes defined motion as “nothing but 
change of place.”234 and he asserted that “all mutation consists in motion.”235These two 
assumptions Hobbes used in politics to argue that change is nothing but change of place. 
For Hobbes, “place” lost its meaning of “home” as in divine cosmos. The motion is a 
merely physical change and has no order.  
Though Hobbes denied that humans can conceive infinity, his universe was 
restless, with a striving of endless motion with no order or end. Because inertial motion 
indicated an infinite universe that was restless, man could not find completion or ends 
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in it. Unlike the old cosmos, it was not ordered by teleological fulfilment.236 Hobbes 
wrote that “Universal things have all but one universal cause, which is motion ...and 
motion cannot be understood to have any other cause besides motion.”237 Moreover, 
Hobbes went further to write that “There can be no cause of motion, except in a body 
contiguous and moved.”238 Natural movement is only a simple continuity. The basic 
characteristic of motion is to persist consistently. There is no need to reach fulfilment.239 
Finally, motion is homogeneous and automatic. Hobbes regards all movements as 
simply one form or another of a simple change of place.240 Hobbes wrote that “Why 
may we not say that all automata (Engines that move themselves by springs and wheeles 
as doth a watch) have an artificial life?”241 Hobbes applied this kind of motion to all 
types of movements rather than merely physical bodies. He extended this basic 
principle to all the constituents of the universe, including nature and mind. “And this 
first endeavor, when it tends towards such things as are known by experience to be 
pleasant, is called appetite, that is, an approaching; and when it shuns what is 
troublesome, aversion, or flying from it.” 242  Here the appetites and aversions are 
“motions of the heart.”243 
Generally, Hobbes argued that men’s natural passions were two-fold; one was for 
gain and appetite, the other for self-preservation, or fear of Death.244  The second 
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instinct dominated the first and naturally “reasoned” a desire for peace. According to 
Oakeshott’s understanding, reason was “not the arbitrary imposition upon the 
passionate nature of man; indeed, it was generated by the passion of fear itself.”245 
Hobbes said commonwealths were demonstrable rather than conjectural as were the 
phenomena of natural philosophy. The motions that caused natural phenomena were 
external to man, but the motions that created commonwealths were internal motions of 
men’s minds.246  In the Leviathan Hobbes defined the Sovereign as the body that 
controlled the power in the commonwealth.  
Borrowing from the recent studies of Harvey, Hobbes also believed that the central 
organ was the heart and it functioned as the controlling organ in the body.  
“For the original of life being in the heart, that motion in the sentient, which is 
propagated to the heart, must necessarily make some alteration or diversion of vital 
motion, namely by quickening or slackening, helping or hindering the same. Now when 
it helpeth, it is pleasure; and when it hindereth it is pain, trouble, grief &c. …Now this 
vital motion is the motion of the blood, perpetually circulating (as hath been shown 
from many infallible signs and marks by Doctor Harvey, the first observer of it in the 
veins and arteries.”247  
The passions motivated human behaviour since the heart determined perceptions, 
feelings, and desires. Man desired what facilitated the circulation of the blood. This 
body politic viewpoint proved that all men were uniformly and internally motivated. 
For Hobbes, “the first dictate of reason is peace; All the rest are means to obtain it, and 
without which peace cannot be had.” 248  In the Leviathan Hobbes discussed the 
definition of reason. “Reason is adding and subtracting, of the consequences of general 
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names agreed upon for the marking and signifying of thoughts.”249 It was reason that 
enabled man to evaluate things. 
In many ways, Hobbes’s philosophy shared with Descartes’s a sense of the 
uncertainty of the real world as essentially different from how we experience it. Since 
Galileo pointed out that the experience of someone on the earth itself could not 
determine whether the earth was rotating, this uncertainty was characteristic of the most 
important achievements of the physical sciences in the seventeenth century. This 
enquiry is a crucial key to understand how the new philosophies built, and became 
inserted into European culture during this time.  
This thesis assumes that this uncertainty came from the possibility of an infinite 
universe with an unfixed centre. The old, hierarchical and divine cosmos could no 
longer provide explanations for human beings to understand the relationship with the 
outside world. Therefore, Hobbes tried to make sense of a material world outside our 
minds without bringing in theological postulates but a physical process. Shapin and 
Schaffer’s book perhaps has succeeded in discussing Thomas Hobbes’s political theory 
and the natural philosophy. They wrote that “We shall suggest that solutions to the 
problem of knowledge are embedded within practical solutions to the problem of social 
order, and that different practical solutions to the problem of social order encapsulate 
contrasting practical solutions to the problem of knowledge.”250 Thomas Hobbes had 
an approach to mechanics that had an influence both on his natural philosophy and his 
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political philosophy. For Hobbes, the central concern was political order as violations 
of natural reason would undermine it. Therefore, his natural philosophical positions 
were based upon an underlying political premise. 
Under this circumstance, Hobbes concluded that “natural law” was based on the 
new motion theory. Hobbes interpreted emotions and minds of men as inner bodies in 
physical motions. Humans’ emotions, like physical motions, were explained as 
motivations.251 Motions continued ceaselessly unless “governed” or refracted by other 
particles in motion. This was different from the traditional theory which believed in 
harmony in man and society. Richard Tuck suggested that Hobbes emphasized that the 
real bodies in motion were the reason why sensations changed, and thus he was able to 
avoid Descartes’ duality that becoming an independent existence of the world. 252 
Thomas A. Spragens, Jr.in The Politics of Motion: The World of Thomas Hobbes 
believed it was revolutionary when Hobbes claimed that reason and fear were both 
internal motions of bodies and the containment was the result of joining them.253 
Spragens defined this process as what Kuhn called “paradigm transformation”: “The 
explicit Aristotelian model is finite and teleological; the Hobbesian counterpart is 
infinite and inertial.”254 Furthermore, this could lay a foundation for Hobbes’s famous 
theory of social contract and sovereignty by explaining motivations with fear and 
reason.  
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Thomas Hobbes and the Sovereign State  
As Alexandre Koyre  ́argued, the aim for modern man was different from medieval 
or ancient man who wanted contemplation of nature and being. Modern man was 
inspired by one’s ability to dominate and master nature.255 Nature, for the sixteenth 
and early seventeenth century thinkers, existed for divine purposes beyond its 
materiality. However, mechanical natural philosophers of the coming age abandoned 
this conceptual premise. The need for a fundamentally natural philosophy called for 
renewed discussions to provide an alternative cosmological system to the ancient and 
medieval one.  
Different from other early modern natural philosophers, Hobbes combined 
scientific methods with political issues which were matters he confronted. The new 
political theory perhaps was significant evidence of the progress from the divine 
cosmos to an infinite universe in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Therefore, 
it is important to understand the construction of his political theory in Leviathan through 
the philosophical basis of his works. 
Last part we have seen how Hobbes dealt with the relationship between natural 
philosophy and his political theory. It is now time to turn to the matter of Hobbes’s 
unique attempt to apply natural philosophy to his political thinking. “That is, conceptual 
patterns and models developed to deal with natural phenomena became prisms through 
which [Hobbes] perceived human and political phenomena.”256 Hobbes derived his 
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political theory based on this foundation. This critical transformation that Hobbes 
performs led to a new concept of nature. Nature has been defined as “a principle of 
motion and change.”257 The new world of nature is not a cause of order but the absence 
of order. It is not a coherent whole instinct towards fulfilment, but merely persists in its 
motion without end. This understanding of nature showed first in his famous statement 
“state of nature.” In fact, Hobbes did not think nature was the reason for order but “the 
state of nature” reveals that order was needed in the beginning.258  
At the pre-political state of nature, anyone who was powerful enough could gain 
control of everything.259 It was believed that nature gave her goods as adequate to 
man’s needs, and man’s just distribution of these could achieve nature’s ends. 260 
However, Hobbes extended the “right to everything” to “right of everyone to 
everything.” “for although any man might say of everything, This is mine, yet could he 
not enjoy it, by reason of his Neighbour, who having equal Right, and equal power, 
would pretend the same thing to be his.”261 The result is “that the natural state of men, 
before they entrd into Society, was a meer War, and that not simply, but a War of all 
men, against all men.”262 
Hobbes asserts that “The cause of war is not that man are willing to have it; for 
the will has nothing for object but good.” But that “man know not the causes neither of 
war nor peace.”263 The intention of Hobbes was not to eliminate or confront the cosmic 
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chaos, instead, he built upon it. Hobbes put the passions and the minds of men as 
motivations replacing the first divine cause. Hobbes stated clearly that, 
 “… as for those that say anything may be moved or produced by itself, by species, by 
its own power, by substantial forms, by incorporeal substances, by instinct, by anti-
peristasis, by antipathy, sympathy, occult quality, and other empty words of schoolmen, 
their saying so is to no purpose.”264  
However, this was revolutionary as Hobbes excluded the divine powers and substituted 
simply motions that merely colliding with other bodies. Furthermore, this implies a 
simple logic that since there was no difference between sublunar and superlunary, the 
entire universe and human society obeyed the same set of natural laws. The old 
hierarchy in which one was higher than the other was contrary to natural law.  
Hobbes made a reconciliation between the divine cosmos in which monarchical 
power was the expression of the cosmos and the natural right which people received 
from the expression of new natural law (motion theory). On the one hand, Hobbes had 
to admit that under the state of nature which was caused by cosmic chaos, all people 
were motivated by the desire of preservation of themselves. Hobbes asserts “All men, 
as soon as they arrive to an understanding of this hateful condition, do desire, even 
nature itself compelling them, to be freed from this misery.” 265  This caused an 
objective result that everyone was naturally equal and acted casually like irregular 
articles. On the other hand, Hobbes replaced the monarchical power by the sovereign 
state whose rights were from the will of people instead of the divine cosmos.  
With the uncertainty of the plurality of worlds and the process of the disappearance 
of order and teleology in nature, Hobbes created a mechanical and artificial universe 
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imitating the organic cosmos. The widening horizon of possibilities occurs as the 
inherent purpose was no longer accepted but rather was given by man.266 Having 
constructed the metaphysical and philosophical premise, especially motion theory, 
Hobbes created the new concept of the state upon the political and psychological nature 
of man. Since this plurality of worlds is no longer reliably arranged for man’s benefit, 
the declining consciousness inevitably transposed from the anthropocentric and 
teleological perspective of man and the world.267 The world was regarded as a system 
developed from matter and nature was seen as a reality that man can anticipate, alter, 
or produce.268  
In this existential universe, Hobbes reduced “divine commands” to merely instinct 
to preserve one’s life, and consequently, “at the very outset of the modern era, Hobbes 
has produced the model of the “rat-race,” . . . with two significant corollaries: ...the 
universalization of anxiety and the relativization of political ends.”269 Like nature, 
society must be ordered and created by men. Society and the state were unnatural. They 
did not reflect any divine purpose or divine order but manifested social purpose and 
social order.  
Only an ordered nature can provide ethical statements or moral judgments. In the 
classical tradition, moral judgments were from nature for human action. Man did not 
create the order of the world and he must reconcile his actions to the given order in 
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which he lives.270 When the logos from nature disappeared, what was left is the will 
which consists of natural motions, appetite and aversion. New concepts and definitions 
of the state, of the commonwealth, and of law were accompanied with a reconsideration 
of personal and social values and ethics. If motion was natural and if law and order 
were human creations, how to fulfil the human goal of peace and public welfare without 
divine restrains? 
This indicates that in Hobbes’s system, the goal of human action is self-
preservation so that man could escape death, even in an ultimate dispensation by God 
in a second existence. “That the place wherein men are to live Eternally, after the 
Resurrection, is the Heavens, meaning by Heaven, those parts of the world, which are 
the most remote from Earth, as where the stars are or above the stars, in another Higher 
Heaven, is not easy to be drawn from any text that I can find.”271 Hobbes did not save 
space for higher hierarchical heaven in his cosmology. He admits that “that man shall 
ascend to his happiness higher than Gods footstool the earth.” On the contrary, “no man 
hath ascended into Heaven, but he that came down from Heaven, even the son of man, 
that is in Heaven.”272  
Hobbes attempted to establish an ethical means by combining it with secular, 
temporal and utilitarian interests. The unrevealing aim was to diminish the unsettling 
possibilities of the plurality of worlds which brought a feeling of insecurity. Unlike 
Bacon who denied the Copernican heliocentric system and insisted on the old cosmos, 
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Hobbes was aware of the latest astronomical knowledge and scientific methodology. 
Different from the optimistic standpoint of Bruno or Descartes, Hobbes held a more 
conservative attitude towards the infinite universe.  
Hobbes secured such a finite and existential system and combined it with the 
secular state which founded individual self-satisfaction upon man’s natural passion. 
Proper evaluation and knowledge of things served social and personal interests. As 
Hobbes affirmed, “reason is the pace; increase of science the way; and the benefit of 
mankind, the end.” Hobbes established systematic ethics based upon man’s natural 
desires and tendencies instead of nature or God’s good.  
In this regard, Hobbes dealt with the relationship between God and man as well. 
Hobbes concluded that Man could name God but he could not know him ontologically 
as the finite creature cannot understand what is infinite. He could not assign any ideas, 
qualities, actions or passive faculties to God since all that had significance for man was 
finite and temporal, and could be referred only to specific things with specific attributes. 
Consequently, nothing human could be explained about God. 
Such a radical and methodological means of evaluation meant that individual and 
social worth and importance were judged against new standards and by new 
processes.273 By doing this, Hobbes successfully replaced the traditionally ordered 
social structure as it could not be justified by these new views. Since Hobbes defined 
the new concepts and definitions of the state, of the commonwealth, and of law, a 
reconsideration of human psychology and of personal and social values and ethics was 
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necessary. In doing this, he tied the security and order of the public realm to the 
aspirations of each individual and provided a foundation for the individual to continue 
to exercise his capacities.  
As the state’s function expanded in this manner the individual’s consciousness of 
his responsibility for his own destiny developed too. Once morality has been defined 
as the human conduct fully appropriate to this reality, this could guarantee man to live 
in peace with each other and escape from conflicts of disagreements and interests. In 
De Cive Hobbes concluded that “one name alone . . . doth signify the nature of God, 
that is, existent…”274 Hobbes mentioned in De Cive that humans feared temporal death 
as greatly as eternal death. The new consciousness identified purpose and meaning in 
the temporal world by understanding motion as natural.  
Hobbes focused on how man lived to fulfil life not life after death. “I put for a 
general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire after power, that 
ceaseth only in death.”275 Man aggrandized in order to secure what was not securable. 
Hobbes’s construction reconciled the psychological need of man to gain peace and 
salvation in an artificial temporal organization. Though men must live in peace, Hobbes 
knew as that the “felicity of this life consisteth not in the repose of a mind 
satisfied…Felicity is a continual progress of the desire, from one object to another.”276  
Mortality defined the need for order and described the realm of salvation. 
Self-consciousness remained a rare and radical exception during the late sixteenth 
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and seventeenth centuries. The divine cosmos once defined a static society that 
conceptually assured peace, security and salvation. Hobbes perhaps was the first 
political theorist who applied a definition of sovereignty upon self-interest, but this self-
definition challenged the received metaphorical idea of order and of social-personal 
relationships.  
The changing ideas of humans’ “self” and society enable a clearer focus on the 
work of the person who defined a new secular order during which the English people 
confronted a crisis in the traditional order. It is reasonable that Thomas Hobbes could 
be the first one who raised a sovereign state theory to solve the problem. Whereas 
traditionally order was founded upon the belief that the divine cosmos naturally 
provides principles, Hobbes’s theory derived from a more empirical political 
consciousness that order was no longer natural, but artificial. It was created by the 
power of a sovereign which was collected from individuals and was manifestly political 
and social.  
There is a striking expression of this new individual-social relationship and the 
individual’s responsibility for defining order and purpose for himself and society, in 
the opening sentences of Hobbes’ introduction to Leviathan.  
“For by art is created that great Leviathan called a commonwealth, or state, in Latin 
civitas, which is but an artificial man; though of greater stature and strength than the 
natural, for whose protection and defense it was intended; and in which the sovereignty 
is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body...... Lastly, the pacts 
and covenants, by which the parts of this body politic were at first made, set together, 
and united, resemble that fiat, or the let us make man, pronounced by God in the 
creation.”277 
Order was no longer natural, but artificial, created by man and based upon political and 
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psychological reality which was a “new consciousness of politics as a matter of 
individual skill and calculation.”278 Unlike the organic cosmos explaining the divine 
purpose inherent in every activity, Hobbes’ metaphor compared the created state to 
created man and thus man was the creator. The Leviathan resembled man structurally; 
it could be organically described. 
Consequently, the Leviathan was created to do man’s will and to fulfill man’s 
purposes and needs. Man created his own order, his own efficient means to peace and 
satisfaction. On the one hand, the state was unnatural. It did not reflect any divine 
purpose or divine order but manifested the political and psychological nature of man. 
On the other hand, men were merely a multitude of individuals who followed natural 
instincts without political organization.279  
In the Elements of Law Hobbes maintained that “all laws are declarations of the m 
ind, concerning some action future to be done, or omitted.”280 This stated that law 
resulted from the motions of mind, and was created by man. Interestingly, Hobbes 
modified this statement in De Cive so that it referred to “Laws of Nature [as] nothing 
else but certain conclusions, understood by reason, of things to be done and omitted”281 
Therefore, Hobbes maintained natural laws, but excluded any divine, external origin. 
And these laws of nature were not necessarily limiting and defining because “actions 
may be so diversified by circumstances and the civil law, that what is done with equity 
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one time is guilty of iniquity at another.”282  
Moreover, Hobbes denied that law and justice existed before men relegated power 
to a sovereign. “Justice and injustice . . . are qualities that related to men in society not 
in solitude.”283 Man’s natural passions became the foundation for a system of civil law 
and the concept of natural law. Hobbes asserted that the law of nature and human law 
“contain each other, and are of equal extent” 284  This point was quite radical and 
different from other philosophers. For Hobbes, “this of our artificial man the 
commonwealth, and his command, that maketh law.”285 
Hobbes extended mechanics to the political field in a well built and ordered 
artificial body, which was constructed for the commonwealth. The motions that caused 
natural phenomena were external to man, but the motions that caused (created) 
commonwealths were internal motions of men’s minds.286 Hobbes needed to look for 
an alternative model to the “organic” body politic. From this perspective, Hobbes seems 
to put the traditional organic model for the body politic into the new mechanical model. 
Therefore, the mechanical motion of the artificial collective body would function under 
laws of nature. 
In the Leviathan Hobbes defined the sovereign as the artificial man that controlled 
the power in the commonwealth. From this perspective, Leviathan made it possible to 
keep a lawful, deterministic sovereign within the laws of nature. Hobbes’ conception 
of man and of man’s creation and the representative secular sovereign state as the basic 
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institutional agent established the foundation on which man could positively enter into 
modernity. The political order of Hobbes, however, posited a non-eschatological 
existence. There is no purpose beyond natural man, which predetermines social, 
personal, or political order. 
Though the organic metaphor was popular in sixteenth-century political theory, 
Hobbes’s use of it was quite startling. It was true that his Leviathan resembled the 
human body. But unlike organic resemblances explaining the divine purpose inherent 
in every activity, Hobbes’ metaphor was created to do man’s will and to fulfil man’s 
purposes and needs. As Walzer reminds us, as reality and theory merged “order became 
a matter of power and power a matter of will, force, and calculation.”287  
Just as the old divine cosmos provided a firm foundation for sixteenth-century 
ideas of society and state, the evolving consciousness of an infinite universe with plural 
inhabitable worlds supported the new conceptions of society and state during the middle 
years of the seventeenth century.  
Hobbes argued that humans created the commonwealth as a re-evaluation of the 
idea of the sovereign state. Without political organization, they were merely a multitude 
of individuals who followed natural instincts and who conformed to no sense of 
order.288 As said, he suggested that the motions that caused natural phenomena were 
external to man, but the motions that caused (created) commonwealths were internal 
motions of men’s minds. Hobbes commonly maintained that “concord amongst men is 
 
287 Walzer, The Revolution of the Saint, p.160. 
288 Thomas Hobbes, De Civie in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, ed. Sir William Molesworth, 11 
vols. (1839-45), vol. 2. 
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artificial, and by way of covenant.”289 The concepts of sovereignty and representation 
were cornerstones for his entire understanding of order and the state. In the Leviathan 
Hobbes defined the sovereign as the body that controlled the power in the 
commonwealth.  
In this respect, Hobbes radically changed the organic sense of representation and 
posited a view of sovereign representation. The sovereign represented the community 
and social and political organization ordered and governed by force of will. The 
sovereign secured man without against living in a condition of chaos, while each man’s 
end became the public good. Hobbes’ sovereign was the authority that conciliated 
means and ends into one ordered society.  
Conclusions about sovereignty and authority required a rethinking of the 
traditional understanding of law and morality. Hobbes asserts that “for a generall 
inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restless desire of Power after power, that 
ceaseth only in death.” Human life, like all the world, move endlessly and insatiably. 
To summarize, Hobbes begins his consideration of the nature and tasks of political 
order from the fundamental paradigm of natural action. To substitute the “divine 
cosmos”, the secular state functioned as an artificial constructed for order and security 
in the world. The new consciousness that understood that motions were natural and that 
order and security were contrived, identified purpose and meaning in the temporal 
world.      
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
289 Thomas Hobbes, Element of law, chapter 19. 
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Conclusion 
The sixteenth- and seventeenth-century underwent a noticeable shift in the 
cosmological challenge from the geocentric model to the model of a plurality of worlds. 
From Copernicus, who decentered Earth from its central position in the cosmos, to 
Newton, who finally defined universal laws, Western Europe and specifically England 
experienced a new approach to enter the modern world.  
Stephen Toulmin argued, “the more vigorously Galileo advocated the new 
Copernican System – the Earth being just one more planet moving around the Sun– the 
more pressing was the need for a full renovation of natural philosophy.”290 Indeed, the 
simultaneous collapse of cosmology affected all realms under threat, and therefore a 
brand new way of order needed to be restored and underpinned. The issue of 
transformation of “natural science” in the scientific revolution from religious theology 
to empirical methodology has been well considered. Though the birthplace of this 
revolution was in Europe, England acted as a leading role in the construction of a new 
order which accorded with the new cosmological model. Thus we have seen that the 
transformation of political thought accorded with the same cosmological 
transformation, particularly in the works of Thomas Hobbes, which has not been fully 
explored.  
More work needs to be done by historians to understand the histories of England’s 
political thought as not only focusing on its practical part but also contributing to a 
fuller understanding of England’s past, present and future. From a wider cosmological 
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background, there are sources that need more exploration. The connection of changing 
cosmological politics with scientific improvements has been overlooked by modern 
scholars. Generally speaking, cosmology may be understood as one of Kuhn’s 
“paradigms” which shapes and orders private and public perceptions of humans, nature 
and God’s relationship. Politics is about how to arrange order in human society. In 
Aristotle’s famous comment, “a human being is by nature a political animal.” The key 
question is how to arrange humans orderly and willingly to be inhabitants on Earth. 
Intellectual history which focuses on the relationship between cosmology and politics 
is concomitantly a history of changes in perception and a history of the change of order. 
A change in cosmos reflects a change in human consciousness. The self-defined, 
articulated, representative order of the mid-seventeenth century resulted from the 
development of self-consciousness. 
In the seventeenth century, along with the development of the scientific method 
and instruments, political order was no longer a perception of the natural order. It 
resided in definition by human consciousness and language developed as an abstract 
tool. It is no coincidence that such a change in consciousness and structuring of reality 
followed upon the development of printing and the Protestant emphasis on “literal” 
interpretation. 
Kuhn’s general paradigm model allows for an examination of this history of self-
definition within the configuration of the larger revolution in science and cosmology. 
“General revolutions in sensibility…are results of an overloading of a received 
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mechanism of encodation beyond its capacity to function at all.”291 Research into this 
change offers insights which support the understanding of the relationship between 
consciousness and order of political theory in early modern England.  
Among philosophers during the period, Thomas Hobbes was perhaps the first one 
to construct his own systematic political order. The key to understanding Hobbes’s 
universe rests in his scientific method. It does not improve or change the normal 
interpreting of Hobbes’s political theory but provides a new cosmic vision which has 
been overlooked. Moreover, it also provides a new perspective of how Hobbes solved 
the problem confronted as a political theorist due to the transformation of cosmology, 
thereby interpreting the political consequences of a different cosmic view.  
By defining order in a representative sovereign state Thomas Hobbes redeemed 
the self in society. For Hobbes, order resided in the definition of humanity and the state 
manifested the creating principle of positive self-society relations. As Voegelin said: 
“Articulation . . . is the condition of representation. In order to come into existence, a 
society must articulate itself by producing a representative that will act for it.”292 
Hobbes made the secular sovereign state the representation. Given the possibilities of a 
plurality of worlds, man creates a self-defined state and simultaneously transfers his 
capacities to his creation which uses them for the benefit of the commonwealth. The 
articulated Leviathan manifests the self-definitive. In conclusion, the opening of 
modern history is a human and creative process associated with the decline of the divine 
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cosmos. It is probably that from Hobbes, the history of modernity becomes the history 
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